

# Sudan Food Assistance Transition Study

Timothy R. Frankenberger  
Jeanne Downen  
John Meyer  
Judy Canahuati  
David Rinck  
Tong Deng Anei

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FANTA Project  
Academy for Educational Development  
1825 Connecticut Avenue, NW  
Washington DC 20009-5721



## Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANTA)

Academy for Educational Development 1825 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20009-5721  
Tel: 202-884-8000 Fax: 202-884-8432 E-mail: [fanta@aed.org](mailto:fanta@aed.org) Website: [www.fantaproject.org](http://www.fantaproject.org)



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Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project  
Academy for Educational Development  
1825 Connecticut Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20009-5721  
Tel: 202-884-8000  
Fax: 202-884-8432  
Email: fanta@aed.org  
Website: www.fantaproject.org

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## ACRONYMS

ACAD	Abyei Community Action for Development
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ANLA	Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment
BNS	Blue Nile State
CES	Central Equatoria State
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CMAM	Community-Based Management of Acute Malnutrition
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CTC	Community Therapeutic Feeding
DA	Disaster Assistance
EAGC	East Africa Grain Council
EES	Eastern Equatoria State
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ENA	Essential Nutrition Action
FANTA	Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance
FAO	Food & Agriculture Organization
FFE	Food for Education
FFP	Food for Peace
FFR	Food for Recovery
FFS	Farmer Field Schools
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FHI	Family Health International
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GFD	General Food Distribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IAS	International Aid Services
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MoAF	Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry
MoH	Ministry of Health
MPI	Ministry of Physical Infrastructure
MYAP	Multi-Year Assistance Program
NBEG	Northern Bahr el Ghazal
NDO	National Development Organization
NGO	Nongovernment Organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

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PHCC	Primary Health Care Centre
RATES	Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Support
REGI	Regional Economic Growth and Integration
RUTF	Ready to Use Therapeutic Feeding
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SHHS	Sudan Household Survey
SHTP	Sudan Health Transformation Project
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
SRRC	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Committee
TANGO	Technical Assistance to NGOs
UNDP	UN Development Program
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UN RCO	UN Resident Coordinator Office
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WARDS	War Affected Rehabilitation and Development in Sudan
WBEG	Western Bahr el Ghazal
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study was designed to assess the impact of stability resulting from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on the most food insecure and nutritionally vulnerable areas and groups in southern Sudan and the Three Areas, and make recommendations about how Title II and Disaster Assistance (DA) resources should be used in addressing the prevailing food security issues. The specific objectives of this review included examining the underlying factors leading to chronic and acute malnutrition, identifying key factors that support and constrain food availability and food access, and determining appropriate food and nonfood interventions to address food insecurity. This information will assist Food for Peace (FFP) and USAID/Sudan to develop options to address food insecurity using Title II and/or DA resources.

To meet these objectives, three teams composed of USAID/FFP and TANGO international staff consulted with a range of stakeholders in Washington D.C., Khartoum, Juba and several field sites. The teams visited southern Sudan from October 2-14, 2007. The states visited were Central and Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warab, Upper Nile and Jonglei. One team also visited Abyei. Many of the study areas were recovering from the heaviest floods in nearly a decade. Prior to the field work, the teams reviewed documentation and background information on southern Sudan.

The report provides an analysis of the current situation and identification of key issues related to food insecurity and the high rates of malnutrition. It examines current Title II activities and recommends how to increase their impact on food security and nutrition. The study proposes next steps for USAID/Sudan in addressing food security by leveraging Title II and DA funds in a complementary manner that emphasizes the multiple transitions taking place in the areas of livelihoods, education, health, nutrition, institutions and security. Finally, the study recommends next steps for moving towards developing a food security strategy (addressing food availability, access and utilization) for the Mission that reinforces the interdependency of livelihoods, markets and infrastructure.

### Key Findings

#### Central and Eastern Equatoria

- **People are on the move** – Reintegration has started but is still ongoing with many internally displaced persons (IDPs) yet to depart for their states of origin and many refugees still expected back from Uganda. Households are slowly returning to areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and have not reestablished sustainable livelihoods.
- **Area is potentially food secure** – With proper investments, food security is possible for many if not most households. Greenbelt and agro-pastoral portions of the two states have many ingredients necessary for economic growth. Soils and rainfall are conducive to productive agriculture. Improved transport would provide ready access to market centers. Natural resources such as forests and wildlife are abundant and population density low.
- **Transportation/transport is a major obstacle** – Major roadways linking Kajo Keji, Nimule and other larger towns with Juba are impassable. Secondary and tertiary roads that might form market links and allow the flow of services to rural areas were unmaintained and

impassable to most vehicles. Most every advance or development that might be imagined for the area is currently impossible due to the poor state of the road network.

- **Agencies unable to monitor adequately** – Constraints of access and resources have limited the ability of agencies to monitor food-based programming, resulting in some mismanagement of food and unsuccessful Food for Recovery/Food for Work (FFR/FFW) activities. Developmental uses of food may be difficult if constraints to monitoring cannot be overcome.
- **Focus on human resources** – Given the shortage of experienced local NGOs and weak government structures and budgets at county and *payam* levels, interventions need to employ a strategy that supports and builds capacity during field work. One key will be facilitated planning exercises with authorities and communities prior to implementation. Other mechanisms, such as managed block grants for counties, should be pushed so that government counterparts gain experience in project design and management.

### Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBEG) and Warab

- **People feel more physically secure as a result of the CPA** – People in the region feel safer to move freely from village to town, and large numbers of displaced people are returning from Khartoum and Darfur. Improved security and improved access to markets has encouraged farmers to produce above subsistence levels.
- **NBEG has the highest number of returnees** – More have returned this year than was expected (over 300,000). This puts tremendous pressure on the food security situation of the host population.
- **A greater number of returnees in NBEG and Warab are from Khartoum and other urban areas in the north** – The livelihood needs of these urban-bred, educated and skilled returnees who can help stimulate the nonfarm economy must be taken into account.
- **The Government of South Sudan (GOSS) at the county and *payam* level does not have the human and financial resources to respond to development demands or even to this year's flood needs** – Warab is a new state and one of the weakest states in terms of human capacity to manage government institutions and respond to development demands and people's expectations of a "peace dividend."
- **NBEG and Warab have one of the highest percentages of food insecurity in south Sudan** – This food insecurity is attributed to large scale displacement, vulnerability to extreme variations in weather, low-level agricultural technologies and limited access to markets. The floods this year will only exacerbate the situation.
- **There are relatively few NGOs working in this region in comparison to need** – Only a few international NGOs and local partners are implementing livelihood and nutrition programs, providing minimal coverage in a few *payams* and in selected counties.
- **The poor road infrastructure, especially during the rainy season, is a significant and recurring challenge to implementation** – Many areas are cut off from the main road for more than six months of the year. Food stocks must be prepositioned and are difficult to replenish until the dry season.
- **Households in the region have the potential to produce adequate food and agricultural surpluses** – However, periodic natural disasters will require that capacity for emergency preparedness and response measures be incorporated into food security programs.

## Upper Nile and Jonglei

- **Recurrent tribal hostilities in the region make it one of the most insecure areas in the south and threaten effective food security programming** – The CPA has had minimal effect on the physical security of the local population.
- **This region is the least developed in terms of access to services, infrastructure and presence of international organizations** – This region receives few resources from GOSS, and programming initiatives in the field are lacking. For those line ministries that do have staff in place, most are unpaid and do not have adequate budgets for operations.
- **Because of the lack of capacity and resources, the local government is very dependent on NGOs to provide social services** – Unfortunately, very few NGOs operate in the area and there is a serious lack of community-based organizations. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and FFP, through their NGO partners, have been instrumental in providing access to water, health facilities, schools and agricultural resources and extension. Local government officials are concerned about what will happen to recovery programs if OFDA funds are cut.
- **The region is suffering from one of the worst floods in recent years, making the area highly food insecure** – Chronic food insecurity will continue in this region as long as the area suffers from intertribal conflict, natural disasters, poor access to services and poor access to transport.
- **Despite the insecurity and recurrent floods, people are starting to move back** – Thousands of people are moving back from Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. The combination of a large number of returnees, flood-affected households and displacement caused by intertribal conflict is making the area more vulnerable to food insecurity.
- **The poor road infrastructure in the region makes program implementation extremely difficult** – Many areas in the region are cut off for six to nine months of the year.

## Abyei

- **The large number of returnees is hampering the recovery of residents** – Food assistance will be needed to reduce food security threats in the short to medium term.
- **Large numbers of people are settling in an unregulated environment** – This has the potential of triggering conflict over land rights and resources. Assistance must be even handed and communicated to all stakeholders in a coordinated manner.
- **There is a serious absence of a civil administration in Abyei to lead development** – Organizational development and capacity building for local NGOs and other organizations should be a priority for donors and international agencies.

## Blue Nile State (BNS)

- **Insecurity remains the greatest obstacle to development in BNS** – Continued militarization of the state along with areas that remain heavily mined make access to the majority of the food insecure difficult.
- **The future stability of BNS will depend upon economic security and equitable development** – Development efforts that show a real peace dividend will be important to preventing potential violence.

- **Increasing pressure on land and natural resources from returnees and the expansion of mechanized farming onto traditional grazing land could pose a serious threat to the region** – There is a need to couple relief assistance for returnees with a rational land policy and much public discussion and negotiation about resettlement.

### Southern Kordofan

- **Security as a whole is problematic** – There is an urgent need to build real and functional judicial and law enforcement organizations. Continued dialogue between pastoralist and farming communities should be facilitated.
- **The CPA divides the political power between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)** – This division represents a huge challenge for the governance of these areas, including the delivery of social services.
- **The expansion of mechanized farming, civil war, displacement of populations and deterioration of services along stock routes has disrupted traditionally respected rules of cooperation between farmers and pastoralists in Kordofan** – This has contributed to continued intertribal conflict in the area

### Overall Recommendations

The operating environment of southern Sudan offers a unique opportunity for USAID to use Title II resources in a strategic way to support the livelihood recovery of the local population. The following programming principles should be taken into account in all interventions being considered.

- **Humanitarian resources and development assistance should be coordinated around the same strategic objectives** – Instead of creating standalone Title II projects that are implemented separately from other mission interventions, attempts should be made to link ongoing programs in health, education, capacity building and livelihood strengthening using food as a complementary resource.
- **NGOs and USAID contractors have different comparative strengths that should be coupled together** – Ways should be sought to combine these strengths, for example, by requiring partnerships between both kinds of organizations on bids submitted in competitive bidding processes (Annual Program Statement or Request for Applications).
- **Different contexts in southern Sudan will require different transition approaches in development relief** – Each area will be going through multiple transitions in terms of the security situation, livelihood strategies and markets and the nature of the state and formal institutions.
- **The government's capacity for disaster response needs to be strengthened because many of the regions will have recurrent emergencies for some time in the future** – Flooding is a widespread and severe problem this year in Upper Nile and Jonglei as well as NBEG and Warab. More emergency food and nonfood items will be needed in these areas in 2007-2008 to respond to the plight of flood victims and returnees.
- **Every intervention should look for ways to build the institutional and human capacity of GOSS** – Food for training could be used to support some of this capacity building.

- **Interventions should have a major focus on women** – Women are the primary farmers in many areas as well as the major caretakers of children.
- **Whenever possible, ways should be sought to engage the youth in program activities** – To reduce future conflict, programs that promote skill development and income generation for the youth will be critical.

Taking these programming principles into account, a number of programming components are proposed.<sup>1</sup> These components would not be implemented simultaneously in all locations but would be phased in depending upon the context.

1. **Social safety nets** should be maintained and improved to manage natural and manmade disasters and to facilitate resettlement. Many of the emergency food aid programs currently being carried out by NGOs and the World Food Program (WFP) will have to continue for the foreseeable future. Key to such programs will be food security information systems (WFP), pre-positioned stocks in areas that are isolated in the rainy season and rapid response capacity. OFDA and FFP funding will be important for these efforts. Strengthening the capacity of GOSS in disaster preparedness and response will be a major activity.
2. **Road construction** – Improved transport infrastructure will be key to effective safety nets, access to social services and access to markets. Trunk roads that connect major urban centers will need culverts for better drainage so that they do not become impassible in the rainy season every year. Farm to market roads would be improved through FFW. NGOs and WFP would help oversee FFW activities related to the development of feeder roads. Roads are the key to any transition strategy.
3. **Basic social service and livelihood support** – Several activities can be implemented to ensure that the peace dividends are passed on to the local population. These include:
  - a. **Public and social service delivery** – Continuing the work carried out by OFDA and FFP in supporting NGOs and UNICEF and WFP in providing public and social services in towns and villages. This includes providing health services, schools and water. Food-assisted Maternal and Child Health (MCH) and school feeding will be given high priority. Every effort should be made to link up with existing health and education projects being implemented by USAID contractors with DA resources. Malnutrition should be addressed through better access and use of water, access to health care, hygiene awareness and better child care and feeding practices. NGOs should develop an effective behavior change communication (BCC) strategy to tackle the major causes of malnutrition. Opportunities will be sought to link up local purchase of food through WFP with school feeding, and using FFW to build infrastructure.
  - b. **Basic infrastructure in small urban centers at the county level should be rehabilitated or developed through block grants to state and county governments** – These urban centers would act as public access points for rural populations. Through the development of such infrastructure, rural catchment areas

<sup>1</sup> Many of these recommendations coincide with those being proposed by other USAID offices.

would have minimal access to health care, schools, water, electricity and communication. Local government would have the capacity and resources to better serve its constituents. These block grants would also be linked to NGO Multi-Year Assistance Programs (MYAPs) in some regions focused on building community capacity and infrastructure in rural areas.

- c. Livelihood support** – Depending upon the main livelihoods in different areas, the type of support will be tailored to what is appropriate (restocking, provision of tools, provision of seed, seed fairs, extension support, training centers for farmers, small scale irrigation systems, soil and water conservation, etc.) FFW would be used to build community infrastructure and to rehabilitate farm to market roads. FFT would be used to support farmer training and farmer field schools. To reestablish agriculturally based livelihoods, access to seed would be locally purchased from contract farmers. Seed fairs and seed vouchers would be used to stimulate the emergence of commercial seed networks. To promote off-farm opportunities, vocational training centers teaching skills in carpentry, masonry, sewing, auto repair and computer skills would receive support. In regions where such vocational training centers do not exist, they would have to be established.
- d. Health and nutrition support<sup>2</sup>** – Southern Sudan has many nutritional emergencies in the middle of adverse living conditions. There are few international organizations and partners actively involved in nutrition programs, and those that are focus on acute malnutrition, when the underlying situation is one of chronic malnutrition. At the community level, there is no real consciousness of the importance of nutrition. There is neither a GOSS mechanism nor the capacity in place to direct/allocate nutrition interventions. Government capacity is far below the ability to respond adequately, and the nascent Nutrition Program faces serious funding constraints.

In the short term, it is recommended that the Sudan Mission bring in a nutritionist to work with its HPN officer to develop a short, medium and long-term strategy for addressing high rates of chronic and acute malnutrition. The Mission should support the introduction of a community-based primary prevention intervention similar to the Gambia Baby Friendly Community Initiative, as a partnership between WFP and UNICEF with the Nutrition Office of the Ministry of Health taking the lead. This could be supported through a John Snow Inc. (JSI) partnership or through an Infant and Young Child Nutrition (IYCN) Cooperative Agreement and through the IYCN partnership with CARE (CARE has an ongoing *Infant Feeding in Emergencies Initiative*).

This intervention would build on the presence of traditional birth attendants and include training of community midwives and primary health care workers at Yei training center and retraining those who have already been trained. The approach could be introduced in communities where there are trained community midwives and/or primary health care workers as a pilot, or, alternatively, where there is already

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<sup>2</sup> The LAYERS tool developed by FANTA should be used to assist USAID/Sudan in monitoring Title II program implementation.

an NGO presence working in agriculture, health and/or community development. It could also build on volunteers in communities where there has been an emergency intervention to rehabilitate severely malnourished children. The intervention would focus on the next child to be born along with rehabilitating current malnourished children under five. The USAID Mission (through FANTA support) should assist in facilitating the finalization of a nutrition policy that a FANTA consultant helped initiate in FY 2007. Finally, the Sudan Mission should assist GOSS in obtaining support from WFP's maternal child health and gender programming services and from UNICEF through its Baby Friendly Health Initiative.

In the medium term, USAID/Sudan should provide continued support through FANTA to the Nutrition Unit in GOSS to:

- Bring to fruition the process of policy development, including the community-based framework
- Determine and analyze gaps in the provision of nutrition services and recommend strategies to address such gaps
- Reach terms of cooperation and coordinate mechanism between GOSS and state levels in the implementation of nutrition services
- Define the multisectoral scope of nutrition programming and recommend government institutional framework for the provision of comprehensive services to improve the overall nutrition situation
- Support Nutrition Unit in obtaining funds for necessary training and supervisory functions at national, state and local levels
- Develop a technical working group that is led by the GOSS Nutrition Unit to involve PVOs, international organizations and bilaterals working to improve nutritional status

**4. Agriculturally based, market-led growth for small holders** – The following activities are proposed to support market-led growth for small holders.

- a. **Link NGO–promoted livelihood support activities with ongoing USAID agriculture support projects** – Existing work being carried out by Land of Lakes on dairy and livestock, AMED, CLTR, UMAD and STEP would be better linked to NGO livelihood promotion activities. Such linkages would emphasize a value chain approach.
- b. **MYAPs would be designed to strengthen farmer to market linkages** – MYAPs would link farmer groups to service providers and markets; farmer field schools and farmer to farmer exchanges would enable new technologies to be introduced; efforts would be made to strengthen input suppliers and better market information would be made available through improved communication channels (cell phones).

Unlike many of its neighbors, southern Sudan had a relatively positive experience with cooperatives, and many farmers look back on this institution in a positive light. Cooperatives could be a useful mechanism to improve terms of trade, both by reducing the cost of marketing surpluses, as well as by lowering the cost of acquiring

- inputs. Cooperatives could have the added advantage of reaching a large number of relatively sparse populations of producers quickly.
- c. **Rural finance would be made available to provide a source of credit** – The provision of better access to credit will support livelihoods through increased investment and market expansion, open opportunities in trade and create employment. Support to microcredit programs is needed to enable households to expand their productive capacity. This will reduce risks associated with storing wealth in livestock, which are subject to loss.
  - d. **GOSS Ministry of Agriculture would be linked with CGIARs to source agricultural technologies** – These would include CYMMT, IITA, ICRISAT, ICRAF and CIP. GOSS currently is receiving a number of improved crop varieties from the center for replication.
  - e. **Agricultural training centers would be better supported** – This includes the Crop Training Center, the Agricultural Training Center being implemented by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the Forestry Training Center, the Fisheries Training Center, the Livestock Training Center and the Wildlife Training Center. Bridging funds would be needed in the short term until these centers can put in place a cost recovery/sustainability strategy.
5. **Market integration** – In southern Sudan, and especially the Green Belt, the programs should be integrated into regional initiatives to develop market institutions. The flagship USAID program to support markets in east and southern Africa is the Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Support (RATES) program, implemented by Chemonics and supported by the Regional Economic Growth and Integration (REGI) office of the USAID East Africa Mission. This program promotes regional trade in four strategic value chains (cotton and textiles, livestock and dairy, coffee and grains). In addition to working with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to improve the enabling policy environment for trade in these commodities, RATES also sets up advocacy organizations to represent stakeholders in the policy arena. In the grains sector, RATES launched the East Africa Grains Council (EAGC) at the Second Annual Grain Trade Summit in Nairobi in April 2007, to promote structured grain trade in COMESA. EAGC is also specifically responsible for harmonizing grading and standards systems, and for establishing a contract arbitration mechanism in the East Africa community.
6. **Potential for Title II multi-year programming** – The team recommends that MYAPs be established in the regions of Central and Eastern Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warab states. In addition, MYAPs could be implemented in the areas around Abyei. Due to flooding and insecurity, emergency programming should continue in Jonglei and Upper Nile.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

USAID/FFP has supported emergency food aid programming throughout southern Sudan's long years of conflict-induced displacement and malnutrition. As a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, USAID/Sudan has developed a new Strategy Statement to respond to the significant challenges and opportunities of supporting the southern Sudanese transition from war to peace. The Strategy Statement focuses on vulnerable areas, and shifts from a sectoral focus to a cross-cutting multisectoral approach that supports the implementation of the CPA. Implementation of the CPA is slow. Institutions and capacities are nascent throughout southern Sudan, and the political and administrative infrastructures of the new government remain weak. Joint integrated units of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have yet to be properly established, and SAF withdrawal from garrison towns is proceeding slowly.

Sudan's 22-year civil war displaced more than 4.6 million people. With relative peace and security, large numbers of people are now returning to their home areas. The reintegration and recovery of livelihoods for displaced and other conflict-affected people is essential. To ensure stability, receiving communities, particularly in rural areas, will need assistance in developing or expanding service provision, including water systems, health clinics and education, as well as enhanced opportunities for economic growth and livelihood recovery, including market recovery and/or development, vocational training, microenterprise development, agriculture and livestock inputs and technology transfer.

After nearly three years of general stability under the CPA, large numbers of people are still in transition and remain precariously vulnerable to food insecurity. Food security will likely remain fragile in the near term but, after 20 years of free food distribution, it is not desirable for Sudan to continue its heavy reliance on international food relief. The CPA has set the stage for a move toward more self-reliance. Abundant natural resources provide a basis for sustainable livelihoods and food security, though the decades of civil war leave a legacy of daunting challenges to establishing a "normal" economy.

## 1.2 Objectives of the Study

The Food Assistance Transition Study teams sought to assess the impact of stability on the most food insecure and nutritionally vulnerable areas and groups in southern Sudan and the Three Areas and make recommendations about how Title II and Disaster Assistance (DA) resources should be used in addressing the prevailing food security issues.

The objectives of this review included examining the underlying factors leading to high rates of chronic and acute malnutrition; identifying key factors that support and constrain food availability, access and utilization and determining appropriate food and nonfood interventions to address the food insecurity. The team was asked to assist Food for Peace (FFP) and USAID/Sudan to develop options to address food insecurity in southern Sudan and the Three Areas using Title II and/or DA funding. In addition, the team examined how food assistance

programs can be improved to better complement the efforts of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), Government of National Unity (GNU) in the Three Areas and USAID development programs in health, agriculture, infrastructure and education.


The study sought to assess current food assistance programs and opportunities and what adjustments might be needed in the future. The team assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of current programs and implementers in food assistance delivery; geographic targeting and coverage; ability to plan and meet the food needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, refugees and demobilized combatants as they reintegrate into communities; the role of food assistance and implications in reducing potential for local level conflicts and options for graduation or exit strategies for food programs.

The team then assessed options for using food assistance to promote food security during and beyond the transition period by addressing the feasibility of using a diversity of food assistance delivery and distribution mechanisms tailored to the local context; linking food assistance to broader livelihood development strategies; exploring opportunities to work with WFP as well as NGO Multi-Year Assistance Programs (MYAPs) in support of livelihood development strategies; developing markets to meet food needs through the use of food assistance and nonfood assistance resources to revive local economies and adjusting current and proposed USAID food assistance.

### **1.3 Methodology**

Three teams composed of USAID/FFP and TANGO International staff consulted with a wide range of stakeholders in Washington D.C., Khartoum, Juba, and in the field sites. The teams consulted with USAID's Africa Bureau; the Office of Food for Peace, the Office for Federal Disaster Assistance and USAID/Sudan; WFP; the Food and Agriculture Organization; European Commission; UNICEF; GOSS officials at national, state and county levels and international and local NGOs dealing with food assistance, food security and other development issues. Field interviews were also held with residents, returnees and IDPs. Prior to the field work, the teams reviewed documentation and background information on southern Sudan.

The teams visited southern Sudan from October 2-14, 2007, visiting Central and Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Warab, Jonglei and Upper Nile. In the Three Areas, only the Abyei area was accessible. Many of the study areas were recovering from the heaviest floods in nearly a decade. Please refer to the map below.



Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Cartographic Section (2007) Sudan Map. Obtained online December 6, 2007 from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf>

The report provides an analysis of the current situation and identifies key issues related to food insecurity and the high rates of malnutrition. It examines current Title II activities and recommends how to increase their impact on food security and nutrition. The study proposes next steps for USAID/Sudan in addressing food security by leveraging Title II and DA funds in a complementary manner that emphasizes the multiple transitions taking place in the areas of livelihoods, institutions and security. Finally, the study recommends next steps for moving toward developing a food security strategy for the Mission that reinforces the interdependency of livelihoods, markets and infrastructure.

## 2. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EQUATORIA

During the period October 5-12, 2007, a study team<sup>3</sup> visited FFP food assistance sites in Central and Eastern Equatoria States (hereafter referred to as CES and EES). Field visits were generally centered on the operational areas of FFP's two NGO partners, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Specifically, the team traveled to Kajo Keji County in CES and visited NPA sites around Mandikolok, Bimurye, Jalimo and Mangalotore. Subsequently, the team traveled to Nimule County in EES, where CRS implements a set of activities. Finally, the team traveled to Torit, the capital of EES, and met with CRS staff from the Ikotos field office, which was inaccessible due to heavy rains. The information collected in the field was complemented by a review of available secondary data and discussions with a wide range of stakeholders. A list of locations visited/persons met is attached in Annex A.

### 2.1 Context

#### What Is the Current Programming Context?

CES and EES, located at the far southern and eastern extremes of south Sudan, are bordered by Uganda to the south, Kenya to the southeast and Ethiopia to the east. Bordering to the north and west are the states of Jonglei, Lakes and Western Equatoria. The states fall mainly within three agro-ecological or livelihood zones. The greenbelt zone, made up of the extreme southwestern corner of EES and southern CES (as well as most of Western Equatoria), is described as having "immense" agricultural potential for a wide variety of crops, including sorghum, maize, millet, cassava, groundnuts, rice, sweet potatoes, fruit, sesame, tobacco, sugarcane, soy beans, vegetables and coffee. The remainder of CES and the western half of EES are a potentially food secure agro-pastoral area. Small-scale livestock production serves as a safety net for years of low crop productivity. The arid pastoralist zone that makes up the eastern half of EES was inaccessible to the team. The tribes in this zone reportedly practice an almost pure form of pastoralism. Cattle raiding and conflict linked to competition for water and grazing land are ongoing security risks in the zone.<sup>4</sup>

Population numbers are difficult to estimate with precision, in anticipation of a census scheduled for 2009. WFP (2007) puts the numbers at roughly 1.07 million in CES and 0.92 million in EES. A varied mix of tribes inhabits the area, including the pastoralist Toposa in the east and a mix of sedentary farming tribes (e.g., Acholi, Madi, Bari, Kuku) in central and western counties. In addition, large numbers of people, mostly of the Dinka tribe, displaced by conflict farther north, have inhabited the area for many years. The capital of south Sudan, Juba, is located in CES and represents a major market for agricultural and other products (now mostly from Uganda but potentially from the Equatorias).

Two major commercial transport routes bisect this zone and connect Uganda with Juba. Feeder roads could connect this region to these major arteries, increasing access to markets and services. For the time being, however, transport is made particularly challenging by the high rainfall and

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<sup>3</sup> The team was comprised of John Meyer, TANGO International, David Rinck, Regional FFP Officer - Nairobi and Florence Nighty, USAID-FFP Food Security Monitor.

<sup>4</sup> From Livelihood Profiles of South Sudan, 2007, E. Muchomba and B. Sharp.

numerous waterways that give the area its production potential. Currently the poor infrastructure diminishes opportunities for any profit from production, both in terms of cost of input delivery and in market access. Kajo Kaji County, a major production area, is completely cut off from the rest of Sudan by the lack of transport access; all commerce from it must transit through Uganda.

### **How Has the CPA Affected These Vulnerable Populations?**

In this part of the country, the signing and implementation of the CPA has brought a level of security that is encouraging people's return to their places of origin. This has been a slow process, however, with many IDPs remaining in southern camps and many refugees still waiting to return from Uganda.<sup>5</sup> Assistance provided to households in the form of seeds, tools and food is permitting some to resume farming activities, although self-sufficiency is not yet assured. The nascent GOSS structure at the county and *payam* levels is only partially operational. A separate peace initiative with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is having a positive impact in the rural areas of western EES. Farming households that sought refuge near Juba, Nimule and elsewhere are just now feeling secure enough to return to their homesteads and plant a crop.

### **What Government Strategies and Programs Related to Food Security Are Currently in Place and What Are the Constraints?**

As elsewhere in south Sudan, GOSS capacity is quite limited, and while policy frameworks are taking shape, programming initiatives in the field are largely lacking. The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (SRRC) assists international agencies during repatriation of and service provision to IDPs and refugees. Line ministries and the public service sector (i.e., schools, health facilities, etc.) have some staff in place (often unpaid) but do not have adequate budgets for operations. State development plans were not shared with the team but may be under preparation for when funds become available. The Ministry of Physical Infrastructure (MPI) is charged with roadwork but has not fully decentralized its operations and is not actively planning road projects in CES and EES. The governor's office in EES made it clear that private sector investment is welcome and essential for significant economic development.

### **In What Ways Is Civil Society Functioning or Not Functioning to Support Food Assistance Programs?**

Primary and secondary data were not available to allow a deep analysis of the current status and function of civil society.<sup>6</sup> A basic assumption in south Sudan is that kinship and social capital are critical to household coping and survival. Disruption of communities and fragmentation of families during conflict and migration may have eroded social capital, although this remains supposition. Respondents did cite tension between returnees and residents who never left in terms of entitlement and expectations for services. Some also note a reluctance of many beneficiaries to contribute labor to community projects (blaming attitudes of dependency), which may have implications for potential public works strategies. Some respondents note that traditional authorities or community leaders recruited to assist with food distribution sometimes

<sup>5</sup> USAID's DCHA estimated that, as of August 2007, 2.2 million additional returnees were expected throughout south Sudan. If past trends hold, most of these will be spontaneous returnees who will need food and other assistance.

<sup>6</sup> Civil society can be defined as *the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values.*

work against the principles of targeted assistance by making arbitrary or self-serving allocation decisions.

## 2.2 Factors Contributing to Food Insecurity and Malnutrition

A recent MoH-sponsored nutritional survey revealed continuing high malnutrition levels, albeit with some improvement over previous years. Then and now, nutritional status has generally been better in CES than in other states.<sup>7</sup> By some calculations, malnutrition is not strongly correlated with food availability and socioeconomic status, leading to hypotheses that high disease burden, poor environmental sanitation, inadequate access to safe water and poor infant care practices are as or more important as causal factors for malnutrition. NGO respondents did not dispute this and highlighted their programming that provides sanitation and nutrition training to households. Anecdotally, the number of people requiring supplemental or therapeutic feeding has decreased in recent months (which may be a coincidence of timing, occurring at the typical end of the hungry season).

However, despite arguments that malnutrition is largely due to nonfood causes, food insecurity remains a problem for many in CES and EES. Both states were deficit cereal producers in 2006 (FAO 2007). WFP reports that households consume on average 1.7 meals per day in both states. In addition, nearly 25 percent of households in EES were rated as “poor” on a food consumption index. (Despite other negative statistics, CES scored high on this index with only 4 percent having “poor” consumption.) Based on these secondary data, observation and respondent feedback, food insecurity is manifest in three ways:

- **Short-term/Acute:** People are still on the move. Many IDPs from Jonglei remain in camps in CES and EES. Residents are slowly returning from Uganda; an unknown but large number is still anticipated.<sup>8</sup> Households are slowly returning to areas affected by the LRA. Food will be difficult to access for all of these households for at least two years.
- **Medium-term/Transition:** The livelihoods of returnee households are not fully recovered. Food/seeds/tools provided to them were inadequate. About 70 percent of households in both CES and EES cultivated less than 2 *feddans* of land in 2006.<sup>9</sup> Wet weather this year damaged crops and lowered yields. Livestock kept by IDPs yet to be repatriated have diminished crop production by entering fields and consuming standing crops. Food access will be constrained for many of these households for one to two years.
- **Long-term/Chronic:** Currently the area supports a largely subsistence farming system. Seed and food markets are poorly integrated. Alternative livelihood options and sources of cash revenues are rare. Human and financial capital are weak.<sup>10</sup> Until these factors are resolved, many households will remain vulnerable to food insecurity.

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary data from 2006 show that only CES has a global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate under 10 percent. For all of south Sudan, the value is 22 percent, indicative of an emergency situation. The GAM for EES was close to the average at 18.7 percent.

<sup>8</sup> More than 75,000 returnees were expected to be assisted in CES and nearly 31,000 for EES in 2007 (WFP ANLA).

<sup>9</sup> Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment, WFP, 2006

<sup>10</sup> For instance, 55 percent of adults in CES are illiterate compared to 76 percent in EES. Another constraint regarding human capital is that the proportion of households headed by women (and probably suffering a labor deficit) is 27 and 48 percent respectively for CES and EES (source Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment, WFP, 2007)

This study did not use methods suitable for creating new estimates of the scope and scale of food insecurity. Secondary data available to the team also fall short of quantifying food insecure populations and locating them geographically. Although these numbers are considered exaggerated by some, WFP estimated that in 2007 about 115,000 people would need food assistance in CES and 183,000 in EES.

### **2.3 Current Food and Nonfood Interventions Being Implemented**

WFP (within the framework of EMOP Sudan 10557.0) is the major implementer of food assistance programming in the Equatorias. The modalities through which WFP provides food include: general food distribution (GFD), therapeutic, supplementary and inpatient feeding programs, school feeding (euphemistically food for education or FFE), food for recovery (FFR) and food for training (FFT). WFP partners with a number of indigenous NGOs and is a direct implementer where partnership with NGOs is impossible. In addition, NPA provides food assistance in some parts of CES, a role mirrored by CRS in several counties in EES. NGOs employ modalities that are similar to those of WFP. In addition, a broad mix of contractors, UN agencies and NGOs are implementing programs in CES and EES that do not involve food distribution but address relevant food security and health themes.

#### **Do Current Programs Address Priority Geographical Areas and Target Groups?**

The areas visited in CES and EES had many food insecure households making them suitable locations for programming.<sup>11</sup> Whether these represent “priority” areas is a determination that the team cannot make in isolation. Geographic priorities can be based on more than relative need and include political, logistic and administrative considerations. In the absence of appropriate quantitative surveys it is difficult to say whether the most appropriate people were targeted, and indeed, whether those people targeted actually received the prescribed benefits. Almost no post-distribution monitoring is taking place for either food or nonfood distributions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that food and other forms of assistance are sometimes diverted to non-targeted households and that local power structures have used food assistance to attract or reward supporters. WFP rightly claims difficult access and the vastness of the territory as reasons for inadequate monitoring. Even so, this does not bode well for developmental uses of food, for which close monitoring is vital.

#### **How to Plan for Meeting the Food Needs of IDP Returnees, Refugees and Demobilized Combatants as They Reintegrate into Communities?**

Observations on the ground reveal a continuation of some of the conditions that made an emergency response necessary, i.e., displaced households were still on the move, livelihood systems not functioning fully.<sup>12</sup> This team was not in a position to evaluate the past and current planning and coordination done by agencies. Two comments can be made however. First, the

<sup>11</sup> CES has a relatively high percentage of returnees (about 21 percent of households according to WFP’s 2006 ANLA). While EES has far fewer returnee households, greater disruption due to conflict makes it a suitable geographic target.

<sup>12</sup> In one camp near Kajo Keji, about 3,700 IDPs remained, down from 6,000 two years before. Camp residents said that the remainder would soon return to Jonglei, with IOM assistance, as local residents would soon be coming back from Uganda to reclaim their land.

assistance provided to a typical returnee household (i.e., three month food ration, seed adequate to sow one *feddan* of land, a hoe) appears to underestimate need. Agencies have contingencies for additional distributions if needed, but it would be difficult to conduct accurate and timely assessments and costly to provide follow up. Second, while rhetoric seems to indicate that emergency programming is no longer necessary, reintegration is ongoing on a significant scale and planning for this should continue as before.

Communities in CES and EES were not affected by floods in the same way as communities in Jonglei, Warrab and elsewhere. However, many respondents, including MoA representatives, stated that the above average rainfall has had a detrimental effect on yield for a number of crops. This will put many households in a difficult situation and may result in a need for food assistance. Further assessment is required in this regard.

## **2.4 Key Issues Related to Expanding Food Assistance Programming to Address Food Insecurity**

### **What Are the Key Constraints in Implementing Food Security and Food Assistance Programs?**

As the situation in south Sudan evolves from emergency to recovery and development, food assistance would naturally need to be more judiciously applied, with careful targeting and well-timed distributions. The track record in CES and EES during the recent past indicates that agencies will not have an easy time with this. Monitoring, whether by government agents or international agencies, has not come close to providing sufficient oversight and control.

A second major constraint is a still weak government capacity, including the absence of operational budgets at the county level and below. The share of GOSS revenues distributed to states is, and will likely continue to be, extremely low. Options are few for generating revenues locally.<sup>13</sup> Major gaps exist in human capital as well, both in terms of the small number of educated/trained individuals available to assume the offices of state and a lack of experience of those in place to deal with the complex problems they face.

Transportation and transport of goods is challenging in CES and EES as it is elsewhere in south Sudan. At the time of this study, for instance, the main roads linking Kajo Keji, an important border town and minor commercial center, with Juba and major towns in northern Uganda were impassable. Nimule, another significant border town, is similarly isolated. Secondary and tertiary roads that might form market links and allow the flow of services to rural areas were unmaintained and impassable to most vehicles. Most every advance or development that might be imagined for the area is currently impossible due to the poor state of the road network.

Finally, the long history of food assistance delivery throughout south Sudan has created a sense of entitlement and dependency amongst beneficiaries and government offices. Evolving food assistance away from direct delivery will require intensive awareness raising and negotiation.

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<sup>13</sup> Merchants complained about a series of informal taxes and duties collected during the transport of goods, particularly when crossing national, state or county lines. This acts as an obstacle to commerce and does not create a stable funding source for government offices.

Some bitterness seems inevitable as communities continue to be weaned of unmonitored general food distribution.

### **Are Current Programs and Implementers Delivering Food Assistance Efficiently and Effectively?**

The nature of this assignment does not allow a fair and thorough evaluation of the food assistance programming of WFP, NPA and CRS. However, a number of issues did come to light during the course of field visits and key informant interviews. In its brief time in the field, this team observed or heard of serious cases of food theft and mismanagement as well as FFR distributions that took place even though the work was never done. The weak monitoring systems noted earlier can be blamed for many of these problems.

The team also observed a number of activities that seemed well managed and were appreciated by beneficiaries. The shea butter cooperatives have potential if certain production and marketing issues can be resolved. Blacksmiths are trained to make ox plows that are affordable and useful to local farmers. Low tech poultry production has been successfully introduced in some localities. Interventions such as these, even when successful, are of limited scope.

## **2.5 Opportunities to Address Food Insecurity Using Title II Resources and DA Funding**

A conducive agro-ecology, proximity of markets and other factors are indicative of the high potential for successful recovery and development in the Equatorias. A basic question that should be answered at this point is whether developmental food assistance is necessary and justified in these states. For reasons noted above, many people remain food insecure in both states. Poor market integration and difficult access mean in-kind food aid remains a viable, if not essential alternative. Progress with regard to peace and reintegration, gaps in infrastructure and a general desire to eliminate attitudes of dependency indicate a need for conditionalities such as labor contributions or attendance in training or education programs. The sections below present ideas for developmental uses of food in conjunction with DA funds.

### **How Can Current Title II Programs Be Adjusted to Provide More Sustainable Support to Food Security and Livelihoods?**

The investments made by FFP, OFDA and their partners, successful in terms of saving lives and achieving other short-term objectives, were not designed for sustainable impact. While other programming (funded by USAID and others) exists, tangible products and impacts on livelihoods were not readily visible in the areas visited. FFP and the USAID Mission would be well served by closely linking resources in a multi-year funding arrangement. Some specific suggestions are found in the next section.

Alternative approaches to food assistance were considered, specifically local purchase of commodities and the use of cash or food vouchers in place of food rations. Production in CES and EES remains so low that significant food purchases in the local market would likely raise prices and have a detrimental effect on local consumers. Contract farming has potential (similar

to the mechanism used for local production/purchase of relief seed), but funds for purchase would need to be guaranteed up front.

Regarding the cash/voucher option, many of the traditional cautionary messages were heard: food might not be available in the market, price inflation might occur, safety of staff would be compromised, etc. Financial institutions and transportation infrastructure, two key factors when considering cash/voucher approaches, are in poor shape. Finally, much of the food being sold in markets comes from Uganda, eliminating at least in the short term benefits to local producers. However, in the interest of stimulating economic activity and strengthening market links, the team recommends a market-based pilot initiative in CES and EES for distributions close to market centers. This might take the form of food fairs, cash or commodity vouchers or other modalities.

### **How Can Food Assistance Programs Be Improved to Better Complement the Efforts of GOSS, GNU and USAID Development Programs in Health, Agriculture, Infrastructure and Education?**

The paragraphs below summarize the current situation for each of the sectors mentioned and offer suggestions for linkages. A global recommendation is that, as a rule, concerned agencies engage in joint planning and coordinated investment of resources in each of the sectors.

#### *Health/Water/Sanitation*

As noted above, compelling arguments are made that high rates of malnutrition in southern Sudan are not fully explained by food shortages, but rather by poor health, sanitation and child care indicators. One study showed that south Sudan has Sudan's highest disease prevalence and lowest proportion of individuals seeking medical treatment and taking prescribed medicines. Some counties in CES have a population to health facility ratio as high as 10,000:1.<sup>14</sup> Among other statistics presented, 43.3 percent of south Sudan households had a child with diarrhea, 45.6 percent had fever/malaria and 28 percent had acute respiratory infection.<sup>15</sup> These statistics were not presented in disaggregated form by state.

No data were available quantifying access to and use of potable water and sanitation facilities in CES and EES. However, secondary data indicate that in the presence of a properly installed borehole and pump, households had a reasonably safe and secure water supply. In cases where no borehole had been installed, water was collected from unprotected sources. Regarding sanitation, local respondents said that tribes living in the areas visited looked favorably on latrine use. Latrine construction, where infrastructure is lacking, accompanied by appropriate awareness training should have a positive health impact. Agencies have attempted to address these nonfood causes of malnutrition in a number of ways. For instance, FFP-sponsored NGOs, including CRS, have linked sanitation education, homestead gardening, mother and child health interventions with supplemental feeding. However, it appears that the scale of investment falls far short of need. FFP should expand the use of FFW in the development of water and sanitation infrastructure. In addition, FFW or FFT could be used to support any community-based health

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<sup>14</sup> From: Jackson C. & Reed, B. 2007

<sup>15</sup> Data are from WFP's draft CFSVA, August 2007.

initiatives developed by the MoH or NGOs. Specifically, food assisted maternal child health and nutrition programs seem to have contributed to lowered malnutrition rates and should continue.

### *Livelihoods/Agriculture*

The traditional livelihood system in most of CES and EES is mixed cropping and small-scale livestock husbandry. As noted above, livelihoods for many households have not yet recovered following the CPA although seed and tool distributions have helped some of the affected households restart agricultural production.<sup>16</sup> Calculations by the team's food security monitor point out an inadequacy of seeds distributed. Each of four types of seeds distributed (sesame, groundnuts, cowpeas and maize) were enough to cultivate one quarter of a *feddan*, or about 0.1 ha each. Seed, like food, is often shared with nonbeneficiary households. For many, ultimately, the small resulting yield would be fully consumed with none saved as seed for the subsequent year. Lack of seed remains a constraint to production, according to farmer respondents. A more sustainable source of seed will be required.

A general assumption regarding returnees is that many of them, particularly young adults, will have lost interest or skills for farming and will cluster around urban centers seeking off-farm employment. This does not seem to be a significant outcome in CES and EES, reportedly because farming was an important activity in refugee camps in Uganda. Both NGOs had interventions teaching nonfarm skills (e.g., blacksmithing), but the numbers trained are low and outcomes such as employment rates or income of graduates unmeasured. Be that as it may, donors should look to continue providing support to the range of NGO-managed training centers. Turnover to government management is premature and would result in closure of the centers.

### *Roads/Infrastructure*

USAID has made road development/rehabilitation one of its core strategies and has contracted Louis Berger for much of this work. The set of roadways targeted or prioritized in this contract is not known to the team, but important corridors could be repaired in both CES and EES. One project already planned, apparently, is an upgraded roadway linking Nimule with Juba; the contractor in this case is not Louis Berger. Another ongoing activity is for feeder road rehabilitation, conducted through FFR. In one community in CES, laborers were seen filling large mud holes within the town limits. While drivers passing through town were certainly grateful for the smoother path, this local approach does not solve the problem of market linkages. CRS reported a more positive case in EES where FFR was the mechanism for fixing the Ikotos-Isoke road, measuring in excess of 20 km. According to project staff, producers now supply the Ikotos food market using the road.

An obvious opportunity for synergy would link work on primary roads, created or repaired through major contracts, and feeder roads built as public works projects supported with FFP resources. Construction contracts would also be necessary to install bridges and culverts at feeder road problem areas. Despite the logic of this linkage, serious obstacles must be overcome. Large-scale public works requires a level of planning, technical expertise and monitoring far beyond

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<sup>16</sup> NPA proposed to provide seed and tools to about 1,800 households in Kajo Keji County. The NPA proposal assumes that households will be able to obtain at least as much seed from other sources as the amount given.

the FFR roadwork currently implemented. A careful balance must be found between setting compensation too low (to target those most in need) and too high (to attract labor). Each has major disadvantages. Issues related to gender and safety, childcare, etc. must be resolved. Finally, a workable plan for maintenance must be included so that gains are not lost with the next year's floods.

### *Education*

EES is one of six states identified as disadvantaged for education, due in part to access constraints and low enrollment. GOSS has not prioritized education in its national budget although the MoE is said to be staffed and active. USAID has focused attention on the education sector through contracts for teacher training, policy development, radio education, etc.<sup>17</sup> FFP in turn has programmed Food for Education (FFE) in CES and EES, implemented by both WFP and CRS, with two logical objectives: targeting food assistance to a traditionally vulnerable group, i.e., children, and motivating enrollment, particularly of girls.

Linkages can be proposed in a number of ways. FFP school facility construction can be linked to GOSS and USAID geographic priorities, with an educational network expanding out from regional towns. FFE can provide an incentive for developing a complete educational environment and experience. To qualify for school feeding, a school must meet standards of: a structure, room for safe food storage, a teacher, a water source and latrines. The vast majority of schools with permanent or durable structures are found in large towns and along significant roadways. FFW and FFE can be useful in spreading the MoE reach.

FFP support can be envisioned in other ways. While substituting food for unpaid government salaries is not permitted, food used to support training and extracurricular activities such as school gardens would provide some incentive for teachers not receiving salaries and could also be used to encourage greater involvement of parents and others in the community. Finally, boarding schools, where they exist, will have food needs that cannot be fulfilled without external support.

### **What Is the Role of Food Assistance in Reducing the Potential for Local Level Conflicts?**

If it is assumed that the LRA is no longer a disrupting factor in the area; the main potential source of conflict in CES and EES remains friction between IDPs and returnees from Uganda. Although respondents indicated that decisions regarding the return of IDPs to their home communities do not depend on availability of aid or social services, food assistance may remain a valid motivating factor for returns. Conversely, perceived inequities in the distribution of food assistance in returnee communities have led to tension, particularly between returnees and residents who never sought refuge elsewhere. Theoretically, a more liberal food assistance policy, involving larger rations to greater numbers, could dissolve that tension, although other problems would likely result.

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<sup>17</sup> School construction funded by USAID is planned through a contract with UNOPS, which has been very slow in its implementation. No UNOPS school construction is under way in CES or EES.

## What Are the Options for Graduation or Exit Strategies for Food Programs?

By definition, graduation should occur when beneficiary households reach an acceptable level of food security. The recovery or creation of sustainable livelihood systems is the basis upon which households will become food secure. Within the restrictions of emergency programming, the assistance provided to returnees has likely been too small to allow the graduation of many households in the short term. A program's exit strategy could take two forms: a) turnover of the function, such as when a service formerly provided by an NGO is integrated into the local government's operations; or b) establish a program that realistically would empower households to be self-sufficient with a gradual withdrawal of external support. Box 1 provides a simple illustration of the pitfalls inherent in "emergency" operations that lack an exit strategy.

### **Box 1: Outreach Agricultural Group, Dadimunguni/Nyabara, Central Equatoria**

This farmers' group had been formed in part to produce groundnut seed for an international NGO working in the area. In previous years, the NGO purchased the seed and distributed it to needy households in other parts of south Sudan. At the time of the team's visit, a large, healthy groundnut plot was nearing maturity, but the NGO, operating with short-term, incremental funding, no longer had a budget for purchase. The farmers claimed that they knew of no other market for the seed, could not access larger towns due to bad roads and did not have storage facilities to keep the product. They felt betrayed.

This case illustrates both the potential for development that exists in the fertile Equatorias as well as the risks of inadequate design or unreliable funding. The productive efforts of these beneficiaries seem to have been compromised due primarily to the constraints of emergency funding mechanisms. The NGO in this case, charged with acquiring seed for distribution, made a good choice to buy from local growers but was unable to program for sustainable outcomes by, for instance, creating a network of seed vendors, developing storage facilities and working to link growers with real markets.

### 3. NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL AND WARAB

A second study team visited locations in the states of Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBEG) and Warab as well as Abyei between October 5 and 15.<sup>18</sup> All areas were recovering from heavy flooding and road access was limited. The field visits centered on the operational areas of the World Food Programme and a few of its principal partners in these areas, primarily World Vision. The areas visited included Aweil, Malualkon and Nyamlell in NBEG; Luanyaker, Akon and Turalei in Warab and Abyei town and Doukra village in Abyei. Field discussions were held with a wide range of stakeholders, including local government officials at the *payam* and county level; SRRC representatives; UN personnel (including WFP, UNDP, the UN Resident Coordinator Office and Recover, Return and Reintegration); NGO staff (WFP Implementing Partners and nonfood organizations) and residents and returnees.

#### 3.1 Context

##### What Is the Current Programming Context?

NBEG is one of the northernmost states of south Sudan, bordered on its northeast and northern edges by the GOS states of Southern Kordofan and Southern Darfur. Its west, southern and eastern borders are contiguous with Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBEG), Warab and Unity states. Warab also shares borders with the states of WBEG, Unity and Lakes. The two states lie mostly in the western flood plains of the Nile, with their southern third extending into the Ironstone Plateau. An extensive river network creates widespread flooding and large expanses of wetlands during the rainy season. During the dry season, water is scarce. Villages tend to be small with widely dispersed households. Larger towns have few buildings or shops built of durable materials like brick or cement block.

The dominant livelihood is agro-pastoral, supplemented by seasonal fishing and a wide variety of wild foods. Output from agriculture will be more rainfall variant, with potential for deficits due to droughts. Rain-fed sorghum, groundnuts and sesame constitute the range of food crops grown in the northern area, with some cash cropping of dry season vegetables and tobacco. Cattle figure prominently as economic and social assets, providing meat, milk, a tradable good and social standing. Annual floods influence livelihood rhythms, characterized by seasonal migration of cattle for water and grazing.<sup>19</sup> Given the low level of agricultural inputs and technology, both states have untapped potential for increased agricultural production at the household level.

A good paved road links the northern areas of this zone with El Obeid, and thence to Khartoum, allowing imports to provide a moderating effect on potential supply fluctuations in this zone. Links to this artery extend deep into this zone, eventually connecting to the commercial centers of Wau and Rumbek. A railway line that once linked Wau to Khartoum remains defunct.

<sup>18</sup> The study team for these areas was Jeanne Downen, TANGO International, and Tong Deng Anei, Food Security and IDP Returns Monitor, University of Missouri/USDA/USAID FFP.

<sup>19</sup> The southern part of the states, which were not visited by the study team, is more dependent on crops as the presence of tsetse fly limits livestock production.

The current population of NBEG is estimated at 1.4 million and Warab at 1.5 million. Intense fighting during the war and a famine in 1998 that killed up to 75,000 people contributed to widespread displacement from NBEG. The state has the highest number of projected returnees in southern Sudan (12 percent of its population), with an estimated 300,000 people returning in 2007.<sup>20</sup> The Dinka are the ethnic majority, primarily of the Twic and Rek clans. In addition, the Misseriya, Arabic nomadic pastoralists, transit traditional grazing routes through NBEG.

### **How Has the CPA Affected These Vulnerable Populations?**

The CPA has brought a measure of confidence to people about their physical security. Residents report that they are now safe to move freely from village to town at any time of day or night, including women. Large numbers of displaced people are returning from Khartoum and Darfur. Improved security and improved access to markets has encouraged farmers to produce above subsistence levels. The more stable environment is credited with improving food security; between 2006 and 2007 the estimated number of food insecure residents declined in NBEG by nearly 150,000 (from 353,591 to 206,424) and by over 137,000 in Warab (from 364,439 to 227,124).<sup>21</sup> A market assessment by Mercy Corps (2007) in Twic County of Warab found that its three main markets have grown considerably since the signing of the CPA and that each has a substantial monthly cash flow.

These positive developments brought about by the CPA carry challenges. In the areas visited, residents welcome returning relatives but say their large numbers put pressure on the hosts' own precarious food security. Residents and returnees alike have high expectations of a "peace dividend" in the form of services, infrastructure and employment. Returnees from urban areas, unable to adjust to village life, are fueling a rapidly increasing unemployed urban population that still depends on rural relatives for their food security and may constitute a drain on rural resources. There is potential for clashes between poor residents, proud of having stayed through the war, and better educated, better off returnees who want to assume a greater role in the community.

### **What Government Strategies and Programs Related to Food Security Are Currently in Place and What Are the Constraints?**

The state government of NBEG prepositions sorghum to be released onto the market during the rainy season to keep prices down when impassable roads lead to scarce supplies (Deng et al. 2007). There are functioning Chambers of Commerce in most markets in NBEG that collect revenue but are not active in planning, organizing and making improvements to markets. The ministries of Agriculture and of the Interior do not appear to have formal linkages with county-level institutions that might inform local planning processes (Mercy Corps 2006). The NBEG Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources lacks a comprehensive policy blueprint for agricultural development, financial support from GOSS and professional staff.

The CPA requires all states to develop a strategic plan for 2007-2011 by December 2007, but states lack the financial resources to pay staff or implement plans. The NBEG state government

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<sup>20</sup> Jackson and Reed 2007, Steffen et al. 2007

<sup>21</sup> WFP/FAO/MoAF 2007

plans to revamp its tax collection system to capture more of the considerable cash that passes through local markets. In Warab state, private oil companies and the government have improved road infrastructure, benefiting local markets. However, Warab is one of the weakest state governments in terms of human capacity; for example, it lacks a tracking system for spontaneous returnees, which makes it difficult for WFP to identify eligible beneficiaries.

GOSS at county and *payam* level does not have the human and financial resources to respond to development demands, or even to this year's flood emergency needs. SRRC officials facilitate community organization for FFR and FFW projects. These officials have been instrumental in convincing communities that free food distribution was ending and that they must work for their food, but SRRC is dependent on WFP and NGOs for funds and implementation. Communities lack information on government plans and have unrealistic expectations for the state. Many expect that the state will be able to provide services and infrastructure in a matter of months rather than years.

### **In What Ways Is Civil Society Functioning or Not Functioning to Support Food Assistance Programs?**

Community leaders and local government are getting the message to communities that free food distribution is over, and that FFR and FFW activities aid local development. A number of local NGOs implement WFP programs and community development activities, though they would benefit from institutional capacity building measures.

Cultural attitudes about sharing and the importance of kinship make targeting of the most vulnerable households an issue that may require intensive discussion and awareness raising within communities. In NBEG, the external manipulation of Dinka-Riziegat relations, both during the war and since the signing of the CPA, continues to be a key factor in their ongoing interactions (Mercy Corps 2006). In Warab state, intertribal conflicts between the Apuk and Aguak Dinkas of Gogrial West and East Counties, and between Dinka and Nuer tribes in Twic County have negatively impacted food security for affected populations.

## **3.2 Factors Contributing to Food Insecurity and Malnutrition**

Nutritional surveys show high Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates in all areas; for example, a recent WFP assessment estimates that 32 percent of children in NBEG under five years of age suffered from acute malnutrition. Adults consume 1.8 meals per day in NBEG and children 2.2. Seventeen percent of households in NBEG were admitted to supplemental feeding centers and 7 percent to therapeutic feeding centers (WFP 2007a). In Warab state, GAM among children under five ranges from 13.1 percent to a high of 20 percent. Rates of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) varied between 1.3 percent and 4.3 percent (World Vision: Pertet 2006a, Pertet 2006b, Pertet 2006c, Pertet 2006d). Both states have been covered by nutritional surveys, primarily carried out by NGOs operating in these areas (WFP/FAO/MoAF 2007).

The primary causes of child malnutrition are thought not to be food insufficiency so much as a combination of poor care practices, the presence of multiple diseases, inadequate knowledge of good hygiene and sanitation, little access to potable water and poor sanitation. Women's work

burden is also a major contributor, causing infants to be left alone for hours while mothers work. Mothers are not only unaware of optimal feeding practices, but their workload is so heavy that it would be difficult for them to act on such knowledge (Deng et al. 2007).

NBEG and Warab have the highest percentage of food insecurity, 40.5 percent and 41.8 percent respectively (WFP CRFSVA 2007). WFP found that 92 percent of NBEG households reported experiencing a food shortage in 2006 (WFP/FAO/MoAF 2007). Interviews with NGOs, WFP and beneficiaries highlighted some of the common aspects of food insecurity:

- **Short-Term/Acute:** In 2007, uneven rainfall produced a poor sorghum crop, which was wiped out by the worst floods since 1999. Residents may be able to self-provision until the first quarter of 2008. Returnees were more severely affected as many unknowingly settled in highly flood-prone areas. Both groups are likely to have insufficient stores of food until the 2008 harvest. Already, farmers in Aweil County in NBEG are borrowing grain from local traders at 60 Sudanese pounds per 90 kgs and repaying at 75 pounds.
- **Medium-Term/Transition:** Returnees receive a three-month resettlement ration and are expected to immediately resume farming. However, it takes an estimated two years to reestablish agricultural production to the point of self-sufficiency. Seed provision has been too little, too late. Poor farmers in Warab say they must work as agricultural laborers during the growing season to eat, limiting their ability to expand production.
- **Long-Term:** The acute insecurity of the war, massive population movements and asset depletion are cited as factors in the 1998 famine in NBEG. The legacy of this time is still felt in the region. Farming is still largely subsistence and markets are just beginning to recover. Both states have the potential to produce and market food surpluses, but production is compromised by limited access to seeds, farming implements and improved technologies such as animal traction and small-scale irrigation.

The WFP/FAO Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment, under way at the time of this study, should provide more quantitative data on the geographical spread of these issues.

### **3.3 Current Food and Nonfood Interventions Being Implemented**

WFP provides the bulk of food assistance in NBEG and Warab. Its interventions include GFD, therapeutic, institutional, inpatient and supplementary feeding, FFE or school feeding, FFT for vocational training centers and training of health workers, FFR and FFW with a range of cooperating partners. Few WFP NGO partners provide direct food assistance; most provide only supplemental and therapeutic feeding. Other NGOs carry out a range of food security interventions that do not involve food assistance. Activities include seed and tool fairs, seed banks, seed multiplication, training in animal traction, agro-forestry, farmer field schools (FFS), fish preservation, food processing and livestock health. Support is also being given to blacksmiths for local manufacture of farm implements and to market infrastructure. Other NGO nonfood interventions are heavily concentrated on primary health care and water. There are nutritional surveillance systems in both states. In response to requests from communities and agricultural extension workers, TearFund and International Aid Services (IAS) established the

Achiek Agricultural Training Center in Aweil East County, NBEG in 2002. The Center gets support from SRRC but is not self-financing.

### **Do Current Programs Address Priority Geographical Areas and Target Groups?**

The statistics for NBEG and Warab indicate they are priority areas for food security and nutrition interventions. However, geographic and program coverage are limited by several factors. Relatively few NGOs are working in the states in comparison to the need. The absence of a road network makes many places inaccessible, especially during the wet season. Only a few international NGOs and local partners are implementing nutrition programs, providing minimal coverage in NBEG and Warab to a few *payams* in selected counties (GOSS 2007). Many NGOs are unwilling or unable to undertake food assistance as operational setup in south Sudan is costly and not completely covered by donors. The dearth of cooperating partners is a problem especially for WFP, which relies on NGOs to handle the community organization and monitoring.

### **Planning for Meeting Food Needs of IDP Returnees, Refugees and Demobilized Combatants as They Reintegrate into Communities**

Donors and GOSS should devote more effort to accurately monitoring the socioeconomic status of different returnee households and how this affects their return strategy and ability to reintegrate into the community. For example, better-off returnees have a strategy for staging their return. They may initially scout out land and general conditions around December, return in March to build a house and do land preparation, and then move with their family only in May at the onset of the wet season. Poor returnees are more likely to make the journey once, arriving with few assets and ill prepared in terms of shelter. Those returning late in the planting season (late May and early June) should also be tracked to ensure they are able to reestablish livelihoods (Pantuliano 2007b). Presently state and local officials are unprepared to track and process large numbers of organized returnees as well as respond to spontaneous returnees.

Several WFP field offices have recommended that returnees receive rations for up to nine months, recognizing that successful resettlement and reintegration takes much longer than the present returnee ration of three months implies. Recurrent emergency conditions such as frequent floods and droughts also need to be factored into food needs. At the time of the survey, flood relief measures and returnee food assistance left no stocks to implement FFR or FFW activities. In Warab, conflicts and floods forced WFP to target over 37,000 IDPs as opposed to the 4,783 originally planned (WFP 2007).

## **3.4 Key Issues Related to Expanding Food Assistance Programming to Address Food Insecurity**

### **What Are the Key Constraints in Implementing Food Security and Food Assistance Programs?**

The poor road infrastructure and rainy season are significant and recurring challenges to implementation. Impassable roads create delays in distributing and monitoring food programs as

staff is often unable to reach field activities by road or air (WFP 2007). Many areas are cut off from the main road six months of the year. Food stocks must be prepositioned and are difficult to replenish until the dry season. Even NGO staff stationed in the field finds its impact dwindles with distance as remote villages are impossible to reach on a regular basis. Logistics also constrain FFW activities as participants want to be paid immediately and will not return if there is no food available.

An entitlement attitude toward free food is making it difficult for NGOs to convince communities to transition to FFR and FFW. This transition is reportedly taking up to a year in some locations. People rarely believe that food assistance will end, so along with intensive communication about the end of free food, rations should be phased out over several months. A similar attitude may exist toward seeds; one NGO's efforts to establish community seed banks stalled because farmers believe they will continue to receive free seeds. During the war, the SRRC and community leaders were accustomed to distributing free food and other inputs without external monitoring, so it may be expected that NGO efforts to monitor food assistance programs will meet some resistance.

Further operational constraints to food programming include continued insecurity in some areas due to intertribal conflict, the limited numbers of NGOs capable of implementing food assistance programs, the low capacity of local authorities and indigenous NGOs, inadequate communication equipment and understaffing.

### **Are Current Programs and Implementers Delivering Food Assistance Efficiently and Effectively?**

Though the field visits were brief, several programs appear to be promising. Training of farmers in animal traction can measurably increase cultivable land and reduce labor input. Support to local blacksmiths making plows and tools can bolster markets and agricultural production together. Farmer field schools are using food and a farmer-to-farmer extension methodology to promote improved technology for small-scale farmers. School teachers reported that school feeding and girls' incentive programs were successful in retaining pupils and attracting more female students. As noted, monitoring of food distributions remains a challenge. The necessity of prepositioning food for the wet season has made warehouses vulnerable to looting from hungry residents who were not targeted.

### **3.5 Opportunities to Address Food Insecurity Using Title II Resources and DA Funding**

Transitional environments such as southern Sudan contain stable and unstable elements, from communities increasingly confident about their security to unforeseen events that can wipe out gains made by recovering households. Households in NBEG and Warab have the potential to produce adequate food and agricultural surpluses. However, periodic natural disasters will require that capacity for emergency preparedness and response measures at the community and local government levels be incorporated into food security programs. Measures to address food insecurity in NBEG and Warab during the current transition should be based on a development relief approach. Development relief promotes economic and social gains while ensuring that

local capacity to reduce risks to food security, respond to emergencies and mitigate the impact of adverse events is strengthened. This flexible program response is enabled through support from both emergency and DA funding.

The scope of the needs and the vastness of southern Sudan are daunting when considering the most appropriate targeting for development interventions. Limited U.S. government resources need to provide complementary and multiple leverage to the greatest degree possible. To achieve this, interventions and support to basic services in health, nutrition, education, water, roads and infrastructure should be focused at the county level in NBEG and Warab. Experience from other countries recovering from conflict shows that separate, unconnected interventions do not produce the synergy needed to stimulate battered economies. Establishing an array of services at a centralized, accessible point will provide a visible benefit to county residents, and thus a tangible “peace dividend.” It should help stimulate communication and trade outward from the county center to villages, though the most rural and potentially the most vulnerable populations will continue to be isolated. NBEG and Warab have four to six counties. Investing in county-level comprehensive services in a small number of counties is both feasible and achieves goals of targeting areas with high numbers of returnees.

### **How Can Current Title II Programs Be Adjusted to Provide More Sustainable Support to Food Security and Livelihoods?**

Current food assistance programs have been funded primarily as short-term, six to 12 month emergency interventions. Exclusive use of short-term funding undermines strategic responses and inhibits NGOs from investing privately raised funds that may be lost if donor support is withdrawn. Additionally, the costs of operating in southern Sudan are high, the environment is difficult and donor funds do not cover all operational contingencies. Given the limited government capacity to carry out development activities, larger NGO programs and more NGOs will be needed. Flexible packages of Title II, DA and emergency funding that can be combined in creative ways can help attract a larger NGO presence with appropriately skilled people in a difficult operating environment.

NGO strengths lie in supporting development at the community and household level, a critical factor but not sufficient to enable the large-scale strides needed in southern Sudan. Title II programs need to offer multiyear funding, coupled with emergency and DA resources in a manner that allows them to complement other USAID investments. Funding through an Annual Program Statement (APS) or RFA/RFP that requires both private contractor and NGO participation may be a vehicle for achieving this.

Food assistance must be carefully monitored to avoid depressing market prices at a time when other resources are aimed at stimulating surplus production. One of USAID’s own studies states that “Nearly all analysts, including WFP, agree that the potential for income transfer provided by food aid is not cost effective. Other forms of income transfers—such as direct cash transfers, animal transfers or vouchers for the purchase of subsidized goods and services—may be more cost-effective” (Deng et al. 2007). While these modalities are not feasible under Title II, USAID should encourage other models of income transfer that will speed southern Sudan’s transition to food self-sufficiency.

## **How Can Food Assistance Programs Be Improved to Better Complement the Efforts of GOSS, GNU and USAID Development Programs in Health, Agriculture, Infrastructure and Education?**

Achieving greater food security in NBEG requires cash opportunities, establishing access to financial institutions, improving market infrastructure and strengthening linkages between northern Sudan and the crop-surplus region of the extreme south (Muchomba and Sharp 2006). Local businessmen in NBEG add infrastructure for transport and storage and education and vocational skills as keys to economic development (Mercy Corps 2006). If the road between Aweil and Wau is completed, markets are expected to boom. Food assistance can be coupled with other types of funding and other donor resources in a number of complementary ways:

### *Health, Water and Sanitation*

The high rates of moderate and severe acute malnutrition underscore the need for education for mothers and other caregivers on optimal child care and feeding practices adapted to the local context. To address severe acute malnutrition, therapeutic feeding centers should be set up at county health centers. Widespread moderate malnutrition can be addressed through supplemental feeding programs, Maternal and Child Health (MCH) and nutrition interventions that use the Positive Deviance/Hearth model approach based on the characteristics of successful child feeding in local communities. Title II resources could be used to support participation at meetings, cooking demonstrations and information on breastfeeding and proper complementary feeding practices. Other donor resources could be used to provide comprehensive primary health care interventions that combine the use of treated bednets, immunization, latrines and vitamin A supplementation.

### *Livelihoods and Agriculture*

After two years of peace, people remain undernourished, food insecure and unable to produce marketable surpluses. There is a great deal of scope for food assistance in the medium term to help people recover their livelihoods. Ideas include:

- Purchasing local food from farmer cooperatives to provision school feeding programs, tying market stimulation with educational needs
- Using FFW to construct water catchments and dikes to retain water during the dry season, grow fodder and encourage zero grazing
- Training people (FFT) in animal traction and to support farmer field schools, which directly benefit women
- Using food to establish female-run fodder nurseries for small ruminants (which provide milk to mothers and children when the rest of the family migrates to the cattle camps)

Institutional resources for agriculture are few in NBEG and Warab. Community-level FFW and FFT interventions could be complemented by donor support of business plan development for the NGO-supported Akiech Agricultural Training Center, with a feasibility analysis of GOSS/MoAF grants and long-term funding possibilities (Deng et al. 2007).

The provision of better access to credit will support livelihoods through increased investment and market expansion, open opportunities in trade and employment creation. Support to microcredit programs is needed to enable households to expand their productive capacity. This will reduce risks associated with storing wealth in livestock, which are subject to loss.

A greater number of returnees in NBEG and Warab are from Khartoum and other urban areas in the north. The livelihood needs of urban-bred, educated or skilled returnees who do not want to farm must be taken into account. The skills of these returnees are sorely needed, but they will not stay unless there are jobs and services. Short-term FFR projects to build local market infrastructure can provide them with immediate food needs, while longer-term development of urban markets, financial facilities and infrastructure will help generate employment for them. DA funds should be used to support such activities.

### *Roads and Infrastructure*

GOSS is constructing main roads to connect NBEG and Warab with urban centers to the north and south. There is significant scope to complement this investment by using FFW to enable communities to build a network of feeder roads connecting villages to main roads, markets and one another. Roads are key to increasing trade, stimulating markets, and providing opportunities for income and critical for getting highly anticipated services to rural areas. Feeder road construction will help leverage benefits from other USAID investments. FFW could also be used to repair and maintain primary roads with professional technical supervision.

Most traders in Twic County in northern Warab State are able to purchase their goods from northern Sudan due to its proximity and the infrastructure connecting the area to Khartoum. However, the roads connecting Twic south to Wau, Juba, Nairobi and Kampala are poor or impassable during much of the year. If road systems connecting Twic to these southern trade centers improve, prices for goods from the south will decrease and supply would increase (Carey et al. 2007).

### *Education*

WFP is providing FFE to attract and retain students, especially females. To improve the quality of the schools, WFP also provides FFW to communities to build the necessary infrastructure for water, sanitation, storage and classroom facilities. The demand for schools is high throughout NBEG and Warab. Title II resources could be used to support communities in the same manner and in so doing could be instrumental in multiplying facilities for primary education available throughout rural areas. FFE programs could be supplemented with school gardens that provide vegetables and other nutritional supplements and act as a means of transmitting messages about nutrition from students to their parents. There are few public secondary schools in existence, and only wealthier families can afford to send their children to the more abundant private secondary schools. Title II could support the establishment of secondary schools in county centers, which out of necessity are boarding schools, by providing FFE.

Vocational and agricultural training centers are needed to provide an array of income-generating skills. USAID funds to establish or support existing centers can be complemented by Title II programs that provide FFT.

### **Role of Food Assistance and Implications in Reducing Potential for Local Level Conflicts**

Food assistance has been used to support meetings to resolve disputes between local groups, such as conflicts over water and grazing rights between pastoralists and farmers. Participants travel long distances under difficult conditions to attend these negotiations. The food serves as an incentive and meets participants' food needs while at the conference. FFP should continue to support the use of food in this manner.

### **Options for Graduation or Exit Strategies for Food Programs**

If the principle that successful recovery requires comprehensive, coordinated interventions is followed, exit strategies would be area-focused and based on: the ongoing provision of a minimum package of basic services supported by government, agricultural production gains that allow households to become food secure and functioning markets that act as conduits for national and international trade. While ambitious, this approach makes more sense in the current climate of southern Sudan than a fragmented, uncoordinated collection of small-scale development projects that meet a local need but are not of sufficient scale to have significant impact.

## 4. UPPER NILE AND JONGLEI

### 4.1 Context

During the period October 4-14, 2007, a third study team visited FFP food assistance sites in Lakes, Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States.<sup>22</sup> Similar to the first team, field visits were generally centered on the operational areas of FFP's two NGO partners, NPA and CRS. Specifically, the team first traveled to Akot in Lakes State and visited the NPA field base operating there. Subsequently, the team traveled by air to Pakur in Unity to observe a distribution site in a Nuer pastoral area. Then the team traveled to Pagak to another NPA-operated field base. This was followed by visits to Potache in Upper Nile and Akobo and Poktab in Jonglei. The team then traveled by vehicle through Twic County and stayed in Wangali, another NPA field base. After this the team visited with CRS staff and the governor of Jonglei in Bor. WFP staff was also contacted in Bor. After Bor, the team traveled by road to Juba and on to Yei to visit NPA sites and agricultural, health and vocational training centers. The information collected in the field was complemented by a review of available secondary data and discussions with a wide range of stakeholders.

#### What Is the Current Programming Context?

Upper Nile and Jonglei fall under the eastern flood plains of the Nile in southern Sudan. This region is bordered on the east by Ethiopia, on the south by Eastern Equatoria, on the west by Lakes and Unity States and on the north by Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. Jonglei is the largest state in southern Sudan but is the least developed in terms of access to services, infrastructure and presence of international organizations. This area is one of the most insecure areas due to inter- and intratribal conflict. Similar to Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warab, an extensive river network creates widespread flooding and large expanses of wetlands during the rainy season. It is currently suffering the worst flood in over 10 years. During the dry season, water is scarce and competition for water and pasture resources is a major source of conflict (WFP/FAO/MoAF 2007).

Villages tend to be small with widely dispersed households. Access to farm land is not a constraint. Access to labor is the determining factor of how much land gets cultivated. Less than 5 percent of the households own ox plows (WFP/FAO/MoAF 2007).

The dominant livelihoods in the region are pastoralism and agro-pastoralism, with some crop production done by women to a greater or lesser degree. The major agricultural crops grown are rain-fed sorghum, maize, cassava, sesame, pumpkin, beans, millet and root crops. Some vegetables are grown in the dry season.<sup>23</sup> On average, households are able to meet their food needs from their own production for about four months. The most commonly accessed wild foods are lalop, water lily seeds and reeds, tamarind, gum from acacia trees, fruits, roots, grains, leaves and wild game.

<sup>22</sup> This team consisted of Tim Frankenberger of TANGO International and Judy Canahuati, FFP. Ken Miller of NPA also accompanied the team up to Juba.

<sup>23</sup> Only 16 percent of the households in Jonglei and 29 percent of the households in Upper Nile had vegetable gardens. One of the main problems is access to seed.

Livestock is a major sector of the economy of Jonglei and Upper Nile and one of the major sources of livelihood for the majority of the population. About 73 percent of households in Jonglei and 65 percent of households in Upper Nile have cattle. Similar to Northern Bahr el Ghazel and Warab, cattle are both economic and social assets, providing meat, milk, a tradable good and social standing. Cattle raiding is a common activity, especially as a way to obtain enough cattle to pay a bride price to get married. Trade and exchange of livestock for food with neighboring groups is linked to seasonal migrations in search of water and pasture (Muchomba and Sharp 2006). The main livestock constraint is the lack of veterinary services. Livestock diseases become even more prevalent during floods.

The White Nile provides a transport link to towns in this zone such as Malakal and Bor, but even this route is currently highly constrained by the underdevelopment of river transport and the scarcity of capable river pilots due to the long break in training during the civil war. A sparse population makes marketing difficult and cost inefficient.

In 2006, the estimated population in Upper Nile was 0.7 million and the number of households was 0.12 million while in Jonglei the estimated population was 1.3 million and the estimated number of households was 0.21 million (WFP & FAO 2007). Almost half of the households are headed by women (48 percent in Jonglei and 44 percent in Upper Nile). The Dinka are the ethnic majority, with Nuer, Muerle and Mondari also living in the region.

### **How Has the CPA Affected These Vulnerable Populations?**

The CPA has had minimal effect on the physical security of the local population in this region. Recurrent tribal hostilities in the flood plain region of Upper Nile and Jonglei threaten effective food security programming, as does the absence of strong local governance. There are still too many armed militias (eight in Jonglei alone) and very little infrastructure. Local governments in both states feel that GOSS has neglected this area and that donors are reluctant to put resources into the region because it is so insecure and underdeveloped.

Despite the insecurity and recurrent floods, people are starting to move back. Thousands of people are returning from Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. The combination of a large number of returnees (160,000 since 2005 in Jonglei alone), flood affected households and insecurity caused by intertribal conflict is making the region more vulnerable to food insecurity.

### **What Government Strategies and Programs Related to Food Security Are Currently in Place and What Are the Constraints?**

This region has received few resources from GOSS, and programming initiatives in the field are largely lacking. Similar to other regions, SRRCC assists international agencies during repatriation of and service provision to IDPs and refugees. Line ministries and the public service sector have some staff in place, but most of these are unpaid and do not have adequate budgets for operations.

The state government of Jonglei has developed a comprehensive strategic plan but does not have the operational budget to implement it. The 2006-2011 Strategic Plan proposes a number of

activities to improve the preventive and curative health care system of the state, physical infrastructure and the education system, with an emphasis on increasing the literacy rate. The plan includes expansion of state roads, bridges, transport, water and sanitation, and housing and building infrastructure that link all counties to the state capital. It also includes social programs that target disadvantaged groups, and youth and women in development (Gov. of Jonglei 2007).

Because of the lack of capacity and resources, the local government is very dependent on NGOs to provide social services to the population. OFDA and FFP through their NGO and UN partners have been instrumental in providing access to water, health facilities, schools and agricultural resources and extension. Many local government officials are concerned about what will happen to recovery programs if OFDA funds are cut. One commissioner in Twic County pointed out that the level of services provided to the area were much better during the war than they are now. Many NGOs are having difficulty obtaining funds during the transition period, and GOSS is not making up the difference.

### **In What Ways Is Civil Society Functioning or Not Functioning to Support Food Assistance Programs?**

Similar to NBEG and Warab, cultural attitudes about sharing and the importance of kinship make targeting of the most vulnerable households an issue. Multiple displacements and the fragmentation of families have had some effect on social ties. Intertribal rivalries over resources have made it difficult for communities and leaders to come together around common causes. Very few NGOs operate in the area, and there is a serious lack of community-based organizations. Dependency on food assistance is still a major problem in the region and will have implications on public works strategies.

## **4.2 Factors Contributing to Food Insecurity and Malnutrition**

The most recent results of the Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS), which was completed in May 2006 confirmed an alarming picture related to malnutrition. The average GAM rate is much greater than the WHO threshold for emergency (>15 percent) in both Upper Nile and Jonglei (>20 percent in both of the states). SAM is very high in Upper Nile and Jonglei (8.9 percent and 9.5 percent respectively) while more than 30 percent of children under age five in Upper Nile suffers from moderate acute malnutrition, and 28 percent of children below five years in Jonglei are reported to be moderately acute malnourished (GOSS 2007).

Approximately 45 percent of children in Jonglei suffered from diarrhea in the last two weeks, while in Upper Nile 41 percent of children suffered from the same disease. More than 36 percent of children in Jonglei and 37 percent of children in Upper Nile had a fever (a proxy for malaria) in the two weeks preceding the recent WFP survey (WFP 2007). Examining prevalence of acute respiratory infection, 40 percent of children in Jonglei and 32 percent of children in Upper Nile reportedly had a cough in the two weeks preceding the survey, and one-fifth of these children had difficulty breathing during these episodes (WFP 2007).

Similar to the other regions, the primary causes of malnutrition are thought to be a combination of poor care practices, the presence of multiple diseases, inadequate knowledge and practice of

good hygiene and sanitation, limited access to health services and poor access to potable water. Upper Nile and Jonglei have fewer boreholes than any other region in south Sudan, and considerable conflict exists around water sources in the dry season. Women's work burden is also a major contributor to child malnutrition because infants are left alone for hours with other family members while mothers work.

The other food security challenges facing households in this region likely comprise a mix of factors—continued small scale insecurity/conflict, natural shocks such as floods and droughts, isolation due to poor road transport, household poverty and limited access to markets and infrastructure. Given the highly pastoral nature of these households, natural disasters like the major flood this year pose a particular hazard (WFP 2007).

Approximately 80 percent of the households in Jonglei and 74 percent of the households in Upper Nile reported experiencing food insecurity during 2006, while 88 percent of households in Jonglei and 79 percent of households in Upper Nile received food assistance during the reference period (WFP/FAO/MoAF 2007).

Based on recent food security studies carried out by WFP, interviews with multiple stakeholders and respondent feedback, food insecurity manifests itself in the region in three ways:

**Short-Term/Acute:** According to the Jonglei governor, the state is experiencing a huge crisis this year due to concurrent flooding and interethnic fighting. Clashes between the Muerle, Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups have resulted in over 300 deaths and injuries to many others. Additionally, the governor reported that flooding has destroyed more than 85 percent of crops in at least five counties: Pochalla, Akobo, Nyriol, Fangak and Bor.<sup>24</sup> Considerably more emergency food assistance will be needed in the area by January.

**Medium-Term/Transition:** The state's population has increased significantly since 2005 due to an influx of returnees and is expected to reach 1 million by December 2007. The strain of this population increase on local resources is significant, as only two functioning hospitals and three secondary schools serve the whole state's population.

**Long-Term/Chronic:** Household poverty is one of the largest threats to food security; households in this region are extremely asset poor when compared to households in Darfur and the rest of Sudan. This is primarily due to multiple displacements caused by the war and interethnic conflict. Lack of market access and lack of transportation infrastructure also pose challenges, as households have difficulty purchasing food in the rainy season. WFP estimates that approximately 40 percent of the population is chronically food insecure (WFP 2007).

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<sup>24</sup> During recent USAID field visits to Upper Nile and Jonglei states, local officials reported that flooding destroyed as much as 90 percent of crops in some areas, raising concerns about food availability in the coming months. Heavy early rains reportedly destroyed the nascent crops of many returnees who were unable to plant until late in the planting season.

### 4.3 Current Food and Nonfood Interventions Being Implemented

WFP is the major implementer of food assistance programming in Upper Nile along with NPA, while in Jonglei WFP, NPA and CRS all program food assistance resources. WFP's interventions include GFD, therapeutic, institutional, inpatient and supplementary feeding, FFE or school feeding, FFT, FFR and FFW. WFP has few implementing partners in this region and is therefore required to be a direct implementer on many of these activities. In places where NPA and CRS operate, the modalities through which food is provided are similar to those of WFP. All three groups are providing support to returnee populations.

NPA and CRS have also been assisting vulnerable households with agricultural inputs, seed multiplication, basic agriculture training and farmer-to-farmer extension methodologies. NPA has also been providing training in animal traction, agro-forestry and livestock health. NPA has also given support to blacksmiths for local manufacture of farm implements. In addition, NPA has been assisting groups of poor rural communities to organize productive activities through cooperatives to generate income and employment and support small rural enterprise development. From 2004 to 2007, NPA has provided training to 5,088 farmers in the Upper Nile and Jonglei. To improve seed access for farmers in Bor County of Jonglei, CRS has also carried out seed fairs.

Although the area has very few NGOs operating in it, there are some that carry out activities that do not involve food assistance directly. For example, Action Against Hunger, the Tear Fund, Goal and Aga Khan are strengthening the capacity of the Primary Health Care Centre staff and community health workers to detect and treat malnutrition. Action Against Hunger and Aga Khan are also supporting the integration of water, sanitation, and hygiene activities. They are also partnering with UNICEF to pilot a nutrition surveillance system using a community-based approach in collaboration with county MoH officials. Save the Children/UK is implementing an integrated food security program focusing on water and sanitation and nutrition. Family Health International has also been implementing agriculture and food security programs in Upper Nile.

#### **Do Current Programs Address Priority Geographical Areas and Target Groups?**

Based on food security information provided by WFP, Upper Nile and Jonglei are priority areas for food insecurity and nutrition interventions. However, similar to NBEG and Warab, geographic and program coverage are limited by the relatively small number of NGOs operating in the area, the absence of road networks and the insecurity caused by interethnic fighting. Many NGOs are unwilling to undertake food assistance programming in the area due to the high costs of setting up an operation, the lack of infrastructure and poor road networks.

#### **Planning for Meeting Food Needs of IDP Returnees, Refugees and Demobilized Combatants as They Reintegrate into Communities**

Currently the food ration and other inputs provided to returnees are not enough to enable them to effectively establish their livelihoods. Both WFP field staff and NGO staff have recommended that returnees receive rations for up to nine months, recognizing that the current ration of three months in the beginning of the cropping season and possibly three months later is not adequate to

support successful resettlement and reintegration. In addition, current flood conditions need to be factored into food needs. The competition for food assistance between flood affected households and returnees could pose serious problems for WFP and NGOs as they try to address the level of need in the area.

#### **4.4 Key Issues Related to Expanding Food Assistance Programming to Address Food Insecurity**

##### **What Are the Key Constraints in Implementing Food Security and Food Assistance Programs?**

As stated earlier, natural hazards such as floods, droughts, conflict and poor infrastructure have made it difficult to implement food security and food assistance programming. Markets are weak and market information is nonexistent. Impassible roads make prepositioning a necessity, and accurately predicting the needs of the affected population is always a challenge. Many areas in this region are cut off for six to nine months of the year.

The current unequal distribution of water facilities, boreholes and shallow wells are also major sources of conflict in many of the counties. OFDA has spent considerable resources trying to improve water access to reduce water wars in the dry season.

Weak government and NGO capacity is also a major constraint. Most of the technically competent individuals in the region have left for Juba or elsewhere to work with other organizations that pay regular salaries. There is weak or nonexistent capacity to provide services to develop agriculture and off-farm activities (e.g., extension services and agricultural research). Few international NGOs are involved in food security programs and their coverage in these states is very limited. The staff that is involved does not have a strong technical background to implement longer term food security programs. Many of these NGOs are also facing a funding problem as donors are unwilling to fund transition programs.

There are problems with dependency as well. People are used to receiving free food, making it difficult to transition to FFR and FFW. In addition, SRRC and tribal leaders are used to distributing food and other inputs with minimal external monitoring so improved monitoring efforts on the part of NGOs may meet some resistance.

##### **Are Current Programs and Implementers Delivering Food Assistance Efficiently and Effectively?**

Although it is difficult to determine whether current programs are effective and efficient, there are promising practices that should be supported in the future. The agricultural training being provided by NPA, the farmer-to-farmer training done by both NPA and CRS and the seed fairs all seem to be activities that should be encouraged. NPA's support to local blacksmiths making plows and tools can significantly enable increased agricultural production. NPA-supported animal health initiatives are also much appreciated by local communities.

School feeding also is having an impact, attracting more female students and retaining pupils. However, monitoring food distributions still remains a challenge as does having appropriate infrastructure and student/teacher ratios.

#### **4.5 Opportunities to Address Food Insecurity Using Title II Resources and DA Funding**

In the near term, food insecurity will continue in Upper Nile and Jonglei as long as the area suffers from intertribal conflict, natural disasters such as floods, poor access to services and poor access to transport. Emergency response capacity and programming will need to be a major focus for some time in the future. Actions should concentrate on initiatives that increase people's access to basic services, improve road access and reduce conflict. For example, interventions that support basic services in health, nutrition, education, water, roads and infrastructure should be focused at the county level. Resources from multiple funding streams should be combined to meet common objectives in service delivery. Establishing an array of services at the county seat will provide a visible benefit to rural county residents and thus a tangible peace dividend.

Where feasible, agricultural interventions would continue to be promoted, building on the lessons learned from NPA and CRS. Interventions should aim to protect and create livelihood assets to enhance household capacity to cope with food insecurity in the long term.

#### **How Can Current Title II Programs Be Adjusted to Provide More Sustainable Support to Food Security and Livelihoods?**

Similar to the other two regions, current OFDA and FFP programs have been funded as emergency interventions with six to 12 month funding streams. These programs have essentially been successful in saving lives, but they were not designed to address longer term food insecurity. Short-term funding makes it difficult for NGOs to do long-term strategic planning and hire staff with the right technical skills to do longer term food security programming. Given the limited government capacity to plan development activities, more NGOs will be needed to expand Title II programming if multiyear programming is being promoted.

Title II multiyear funding should be combined with emergency and DA funding in the same areas to achieve a synergistic effect. NGOs could concentrate on supporting development at the community level while private contractors could focus on strengthening institutions at the state and county level.

#### **How Can Food Assistance Programs Be Improved to Better Complement the Efforts of GOSS, GNU and USAID Development Programs in Health, Agriculture, Infrastructure and Education?**

Similar to the other regions, food assistance can be combined with other types of funding and resources to promote complementary investments:

### *Health, Water and Sanitation*

FFP-sponsored NGOs could focus on MCH and nutrition interventions that provide education for mothers and other caregivers on optimal child care and feeding practices, sanitation education, home gardens and supplemental feeding to help prevent malnutrition and detect cases of severe acute malnutrition. The high rate of moderate malnutrition should be addressed through community-based programs such as the Positive Deviance/Hearth model approach, as noted above. Cases of acute severe malnutrition should be addressed through therapeutic feeding and education for mothers in county-level health centers. DA resources could be used to strengthen primary health care.

### *Livelihood and Agriculture*

These interventions would build on the work that has been promoted by NPA and CRS in the region. FFT would continue to be used to train farmers in animal traction and appropriate farming techniques as well as to support farmer field schools. A sufficiently dependable market in towns like Bor means that surpluses generated by farmers' groups could be used to provision schools doing school feeding (WFP); multiple purposes could be served by combining interventions. To reduce conflict between tribes over water resources, FFW could be used to construct water catchments and dikes to retain water in the dry season in various locations.

FFT could also be used to equip returnees that do not want to return to farming with skills that will be sorely needed to support infrastructure development in the small urban centers. Currently there are very few people with building and carpentry skills or skills to use the computers that are being provided at the state and county level as part of institutional capacity building programs. For example, in Yei town the vocational training center that NPA supports is training people in computer skills.

### *Roads and Infrastructure*

Trunk roads are being constructed to link the main urban centers across the south. Unfortunately, these roads are washed out every rainy season because proper drainage systems and culverts are not being constructed. These roads could be made passable if such investments could be made.

A major opportunity for synergy would be to link these primary roads created or repaired through major contracts with feeder roads built as public works supported by FFP resources. FFW activities could enable communities to connect villages to main roads, markets and one another. As stated previously, roads are critical to transition programming; they enable markets to develop, services to be delivered and provide opportunities for households to generate income. FFW could also be used to repair and maintain primary roads with the right technical supervision. To enable this linkage to be realized, feeder road construction will require a level of planning and technical expertise currently not found in the region.

### *Education*

The demand for schools in this region is high. FFP has supported education programming through FFE implemented by both WFP and CRS. This program has attracted and retained students in schools, especially girls. WFP has also used FFW to build necessary school infrastructure such as water facilities, latrines, storage structures and classroom facilities. Title II resources should continue to be used for these purposes as well as to support school gardens as a way of transmitting nutrition messages to students and their parents. Gardens could also provide some incentive to teachers not receiving a salary.

USAID has used DA resources in the education sector to support teacher training, policy development and radio education. FFP resources could be linked with these DA resources when the same geographical areas are being targeted.

### **Role of Food Assistance and Implications in Reducing Potential for Local-Level Conflicts**

As stated earlier, food assistance can be used to construct water catchment structures to reduce conflict over water sources in the dry season. In addition, using food assistance to build infrastructure in areas previously neglected can help reduce tension.

### **Options for Graduation or Exit Strategies for Food Programs**

Every FFP-funded activity should have an exit strategy built into it from the start. Even if food security is not achieved, government structures and resources should be in place to carry on the activities started by the NGOs and WFP. Therefore, capacity building of local government is key in every intervention implemented. Exit strategies should be area focused and based on a minimum package of public services supported by the government.

## 5. KEY FOOD AID ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN THE THREE AREAS<sup>25</sup>

### 5.1 Abyei

#### 5.1.1 Context

Abyei straddles the border between north and south Sudan. It has been characterized as a “microcosm of the challenges faced at national level: religion, race, culture, water, land, oil and other natural resources” (Matus, 2007).

The area was 85 percent depopulated during the war and many traditional social structures were destroyed. With the peace, Abyei is undergoing rapid social and economic transition. Former residents are resettling along with new economic migrants from both north and south. In 2007, returnees, IDPs and migrants comprised more than 43 percent of the households (WFP 2007b). About one-third of IDPs are from Khartoum and two-thirds from the south, primarily from NBEG and Warab.

There are four primary livelihood patterns in the Abyei area, all in the early stages of recovery: 1) south of Abyei, there are agro-pastoralists who maintained subsistence production during the war and are now expanding their farms and herds; 2) town residents, many of them new arrivals who live on wage employment (primarily through international agencies), remittances, petty trade and support from relatives; 3) north of the river to Todac, returnees, mostly from northern Sudan, are settling but lack farming skills and are unsure of their livelihoods and 4) north of Todac, seasonal sharecroppers and economic migrants living around the oil fields, many of whom are now returning south. This last area has a volatile mix of actors, many of them armed, and needs a UN/NGO presence to encourage stability and recovery (Matus 2007b).

The area has been stable but tense since GOSS pulled out of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in October 2007. UN humanitarian and NGO presence north of Abyei is limited by problems of access, insecurity and difficult working conditions. All areas lack basic services in health, agriculture, education and water.

#### 5.1.2 Key Points

- The large number of returnees is hampering the recovery of residents, many recently resettled themselves, by relying on them for support. With new migrants joining returning residents, food assistance will be needed to reduce threats of short- to medium-term food insecurity and to support longer-term gains in agricultural production and marketing.
- North of Abyei, large numbers of people settling in an unregulated environment have the potential to trigger conflict over land rights and resources. Development and relief interventions must be seen as even-handed and communicated to all stakeholders in a coordinated manner.

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<sup>25</sup> The information collected on the Three Areas was not as extensive as the other regions visited due to travel restrictions.

- In the absence of a civil administration in Abyei to lead development, the SRRC, UN, NGOs, local NGOs and community leaders are moving forward with their own initiatives supported by USAID, UNDP and FAO. Organizational development and capacity building for local NGOs and other organizations should be a priority for donors and international agencies. There are few international NGOs, mostly concentrated around Abyei.
- Security is critical to create an enabling environment for development and to integrate excombatants into civil society in the Abyei area.
- The discovery of oil in the Abyei area poses a challenge to agricultural production, sustainable utilization, environmental protection and social stability.
- Land use in Abyei is traditionally spread out but in a corporate context of villages and sections. The challenge is to build on these indigenous preferences through the adoption of appropriate technologies and reformulations within larger design schemes. This process will require investigation into how waste management, water treatment, irrigation, road construction, telecommunication and social services can be integrated within a design scheme for the physical environment (ACDC 2005).

### 5.1.3 Recommendations

- Title II and DA funding can be used to reinforce the CPA by focusing on the two largest and most food insecure groups, returnees and migrants.
- For UN agencies and partners<sup>26</sup> working in the area of food security and livelihoods, the strategic priorities for 2008 emphasize meeting the immediate food security needs of vulnerable populations as well as providing agricultural training and inputs to facilitate the recovery process. The area is fertile and traditionally, Abyei produced surplus seed for distribution, so it would appear that it has potential for surplus production.
- Food assistance for new returnees will continue to be provided in line with assessment recommendations, while FFW community asset creation will provide a mechanism to assist recent returnees and vulnerable residents of host communities.
- WFP's 2007 Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment (ANLA) suggests that returnee, IDP/migrant and female-headed resident households could be targeted for assistance. Support to returnees and migrants would be temporary emergency assistance aimed at minimizing the impact of a temporary disruption and allowing households to rebuild their livelihoods more quickly (WFP 2007b). Residents, who are themselves recovering, should be provided with FFR, FFW and food and nonfood interventions supporting improved agricultural production and market linkages.
- Veterinary services, restocking and support for fishery activities will help to improve household animal husbandry and livelihood diversification. Small-scale commercial

<sup>26</sup> The partners are as follows: FAO, WFP, WARDS, ACAD, SC/SU, RRR/UNMIS, ARRP, NDO, SRRC/HAC, UNDP, SC/US).

agricultural activities will be given support and alternative livelihood strategies will be encouraged through integrated rural development projects and FFT (SRRC/HAC 2007).

- The area north of Abyei has potential for groundnut and sesame production. Support for improved agricultural production that factors in demand from northern markets would stimulate production and markets.
- An intensive recovery effort is needed to the north and south as well as in the migration corridors. It will require NGOs experienced in dealing with armed groups, demobilized soldiers and youth. Assistance to integrate excombatants into civil society is also critical.
- Abyei is a major trade link between the north and south. Consequently, HIV is likely to become a greater threat as trade improves, though the rate of infection is not well documented. Information, education and communication measures aimed at prevention should be part of any intervention package. However, people have not produced surpluses because markets are inaccessible. Completion of the road from Wau to Abyei and the Nuba Mountains and Khartoum will boost local production in NBEG and Warab and equalize trade with the north. Currently, traders from Khartoum bring expensive manufactured goods to the area and return north with empty trucks. It is in the interests of both north and south to expand markets for their respective manufactured and agricultural/livestock goods.
- Village markets could be revitalized to take greater advantage of growing trade through FFR and FFW projects for drainage, stalls, latrines, garbage collection, water and similar interventions.
- The aid package assumes everyone can and will farm, but towns (Abyei, Muglad, Meiram) are overburdened with new arrivals who will likely stay. Food assistance and DA resources should be used to support technical and vocational training to returnees in urban areas to support stability and the growth of essential nonfarm services.
- A UN strategy is to use negotiations with communities over aid to discuss sensitive issues of land use and water in the migration corridor. Food assistance could also support forums to promote peace building among communities that may come into conflict.

## 5.2 Blue Nile State (BNS)

### 5.2.1 Context<sup>27</sup>

The BNS, in southeastern Sudan, is fertile woodland savannah with high rainfall. The state contains valuable natural resources, including gold, a hydroelectric dam and the Dinder National Park. Despite their contributions to the national economy, the way in which these resources were developed is considered one of the root causes of the war (Matus 2006).

The population is approximately 850,000, split among some 40 ethnic groups, with an annual growth rate close to 2.3 percent. These groups have historically coexisted peacefully. Most are

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<sup>27</sup> This team was unable to access the Blue Nile State (BNS). The following information is from secondary sources, including cited documents and informants with recent experience in the state.

farmers and pastoralists, though about 25 percent of the population lives in urban areas. The literacy rate is 36.7 percent and the infant mortality rate is 137 /1000. The security situation is calm with the exception of some land disputes and the threat of land mines. A heavy military presence remains in the state.

Many former residents are still living in refugee camps in Ethiopia while others are in IDP camps elsewhere in Sudan. As of mid-2007, the number of returnees has been constrained by the lack of infrastructure in the destination areas (only 5 percent of current residents are returnees). However, following the CPA, most of the refugees and IDPs indicated that they are interested in returning to their places of origin if conditions were improved. UNHCR and its partners estimated that about 45,000 people would return, both assisted and spontaneous, in 2007. Approximately 22 percent of households received food assistance during the 12 months preceding the late-2006 ANLA survey, including 77 percent of returnee households (WFP 2007b).

There are three types of returnees a) the refugees returning from Ethiopia b) IDPs returning from outside of the BNS mainly from Khartoum and c) IDPs from elsewhere in the BNS (mainly the Damazine and Roseries areas) returning to their land of origin or resettlement areas. WFP estimated the return of 103,000 people during 2007 (WFP 2006).

GOSS Secretariat of Health cited children under two years of age and pregnant and lactating women as “priority groups,” which are “most vulnerable” to malnutrition and therefore the focus of the nutrition action plan.<sup>28</sup>

### 5.2.2 Key Points

- Insecurity remains the greatest obstacle to development in BNS.<sup>29</sup> Continued militarization of the state, along with areas that remain heavily mined, make access to the majority of food-insecure areas difficult.
- According to Matus (2006), the most critical “laws that affect food security and economic growth relate to people’s right to land, including natural resources. Little progress is evident in resolving land disputes and establishing land.”
- The future stability of BNS will depend on economic security and equitable development. BNS citizens do not widely understand that they will not have the choice to join south Sudan. Development efforts that show a real peace dividend will be important in mitigating the frustration or preventing the violence that may be coming.<sup>30</sup>
- In the short to medium term, the arrival of returnees will place an additional burden on the host communities and the already weak infrastructure and services. The presence of

<sup>28</sup> South Sudan. The New Sudan Nutrition Policy and Plan of Action 2004-2010 for Implementation in New Sudan, Nuba Mountain, Blue Nile and Abyei Area. Secretariat of Health, 2004.

<sup>29</sup> *Sudan Tribune*, July 15, 2007.

<sup>30</sup> The complexities of CPA arrangements in the Three Areas and diversity of opinion about current status and future prospects are detailed in Cook, T.D. 2007. *An Exploration of Citizen Opinion on the Implementation of the CPA in the Three Areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile*.

landmines is a constraint to returns and agricultural activity, particularly in the south of the state (WFP 2007b).

- Over 48 percent of households experienced food shortages during the month preceding one study. Although 94 percent of resident households cultivated during the most recent cropping season, the level of participation in agriculture is much lower for returnee households (39 percent) and IDP households (42 percent). Land ownership is one factor related to noncultivation, with residents more likely to own land (81 percent) than returnees (61 percent) or IDPs (52 percent) (WFP 2007b).
- Increasing pressure on land and natural resources from returnees and the expansion of mechanized farming onto traditional grazing lands points to the need to couple relief assistance for returnees with a rational land policy and much public discussion and negotiation about resettlement.
- An obstacle to programming is the unusual governance arrangement, with power-sharing between GNU and GOSS. Many details of critical governance issues, such as land reform, decentralization and the devolution of authority are still in the process of being worked out. The general perception among residents is that development initiatives pushed by GOSS are stymied by recalcitrant northern authorities. In the meantime, it was reported that WFP and NGOs have tended to bypass government during planning exercises, generating some resentment.
- Overall rates of malnutrition remain at or near emergency levels. Inappropriate care and feeding practices are believed to be one of the main causal factors, along with low water availability, poor sanitation and endemic diseases.
- Food insecurity is linked to irregular rainfall, pest attacks, weed infestation and dry spells. About 14,000 households were affected by the 2007 floods. Many traditional farmers are also exposed to agro-climatic risks, such as during planting time, early season.
- WFP delivers food assistance through GFD, FFE, FFT, FFR and institutional feeding, but the scale of operations is quite small in some cases. However, there are only two international NGOs of note and government capacity is low, factors which limit the effectiveness of programming.
- Asphalt roads link BNS with Khartoum, Medani and Sennar on the main trade route in central Sudan. The state also benefits from cross-border trade with Ethiopia. The majority of its roads become completely inaccessible during the six-month wet season, while an equally large majority remains off limits year-round, due to land mines.
- Health services are an acute need. The infant mortality rate is 87:1,000, and the state has the lowest life expectancy for women (51.2 years). Malaria and a rising rate of HIV infection are major concerns. Only 40 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water in the north of the state, and only 10 percent in the south (FAO/WFP 2007, WFP/UNICEF 2006).

### 5.2.3 Recommendations

- Housing for returnees is quite poor. A FFR or FFW program designed to build suitable habitat, along with other household or community structures, may have merit. While use of FFW for private goods is discouraged due to distorted incentives, it may be appropriate in this case as house construction is a one-time deal. Some building materials may be available locally and could constitute the community contribution. Complementary resources such as cement and/or masonry services may need to be provided.
- The agricultural sector has been constrained in part by problematic access to markets, particularly in the south, throughout the rainy season. Agricultural support has been largely limited to provision of seeds and tools to returnees. Other development-oriented interventions could increase the productivity of small holders for equitable economic development.
- An opportunity for programming is the accessibility of credit from a (at least partially) functioning financial sector. More than 70 percent of households reported access to credit, most often from banks and traders. Currently the most common use for credit is to purchase food, while only about 36 percent of households used credit to purchase productive inputs (WFP 2007b).
- FFW can be useful in creating primary health care infrastructure and motivating attendance at health-related training events. Improvements in health services will require complementary resources and efforts, for instance, to staff and equip health care facilities.
- The economic potential of BNS could be expanded by solving transport constraints. Although nothing is reported on the receptivity of local populations to FFW, it is conceivable BNS could benefit from such public works, with USAID-funded engineering support as needed. De-mining is an obvious precursor to extensive road improvement, however.
- FFW is potentially important in facilitating the quick construction of at least temporary school structures, and school feeding could conceivably be increased to assist a greater percentage of vulnerable children. Teachers in BNS are reportedly having even greater difficulty getting paid than elsewhere in south Sudan. Food to support unpaid school staff is an option worth considering.

## 5.3 Southern Kordofan

### 5.3.1 Context

Southern Kordofan State includes the Nuba Mountains and borders the states of Upper Nile to the east, Unity to the south, Northern Kordofan to the north and the Abyei region to the west.

The conflict led to the widespread destruction of traditional sources of livelihood and massive internal displacement. Fighting mainly affected the central part of Southern Kordofan known as the Nuba Mountains. This area is inhabited by a complex mix of people comprising 50 different groups speaking 50 different languages. Despite this great heterogeneity, these groups share a

number of fundamental common cultural practices and beliefs, and widely recognize themselves as Nuba.

The state has fertile soils, plentiful rainfall (ranging from about 350 mm in the north to about 800 mm in the south) and dense vegetation. The share of agriculture and natural resources in the state's income has been estimated at 57 percent, and agriculture and livestock production are the main livelihood sources for most of the population. An estimated 65 percent of households are sedentary farmers, while about 23 percent are nomadic pastoralists and around 12 percent are urban and semi-urban dwellers (WFP 2007b). There are several livelihood systems in the area, including agro-pastoralism, transhumant pastoralism, agro-pastoral fishing and trade (JAM 2005).

South Kordofan is one of the CPA-defined "transitional areas," administered jointly by GNU and SPLM. As a result, two parallel authorities are currently operating in various regions of the state, with limited coordination between them.

As in other regions of the former conflict zone, a primary concern of food assistance partners in South Kordofan is the return process. Services for returnees (health, education, agriculture) continue to be critical concerns for persons returning to former areas of residence.

### 5.3.2 Key Points

- Security as a whole is problematic in Southern Kordofan in particular, where communities perceive an absence of patrolling, and small arms proliferation contributes to the still-volatile relationship between nomads and farmers. There is an urgent need for clarification regarding the level of special development transfers for the region, and the UN and NGOs should provide technical support to state authorities to help them build real and functional judicial and law enforcement organizations. Continued dialogue between pastoralist and farming communities should be facilitated (Pantuliano et al. 2007).
- The CPA divides the political power between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. This division represents a huge challenge for the governance of these areas, including the delivery of social services. In Southern Kordofan the state legislative council has been unable to endorse the constitution since the signing of the CPA in 2005 because of continuing disputes between the two ruling parties (WFP/FAO/MoAF 2007).
- The expansion of mechanized farming, civil war, displacement of populations and deterioration of services along stock routes has disrupted traditionally respected rules of cooperation between farmers and pastoralists in Kordofan. Many *maracheel* (traditional stock routes) have become less viable or abandoned as pastoralists increasingly encroach onto farmland. Similarly, increased population density and lack of agricultural technology have limited the agricultural productivity of small holdings, leading farmers to expand into areas adjacent to established stock routes. Each of these factors has contributed to continued intertribal conflict in the area (IFPRI 2006).

- Southern Kordofan has significant agricultural production potential, and there is a need to consider the best modalities to make optimum use of available resources. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has plans to increase agricultural production and strengthen marketing of agricultural products through farmer field school approaches, however, roads and transportation have to be improved first.
- The poor condition of road networks is a source of frustration for returnees who feel isolated from markets and opportunities. Infrastructure rehabilitation in the region has so far been haphazard and ineffective, often prioritizing the most accessible communities rather than those in the greatest need and failing to provide for system maintenance (Pantuliano et al. 2007).
- As in most cases, the current programs do not use a development relief approach. Food for work/cash for work modalities could smooth the transition between emergency assistance and development interventions. Development agencies should acquire capacities to scale up rehabilitation/recovery types of interventions.
- Similar to the other two areas, Southern Kordofan has high levels of malnutrition and food insecurity.

### **5.3.3 Recommendations**

- Investment in infrastructure in Southern Kordofan is a critical priority, particularly as all-weather roads and rail can act as “connectors” between the north and south and within the Three Areas themselves. Funding in general should have the direct benefit of increasing access to basic human services such as water supply, electricity or transport.
- NGOs should focus on increasing agricultural production, livestock, fisheries, forestry, biodiversity and wildlife conservation.
- There is a significant need for water, sanitation, school rehabilitation and health facilities rehabilitation, especially in areas with large numbers of returnees. To address these needs, possibilities should be explored to use food for work/cash for work. Similar to other areas, the prevention and treatment of severe and moderate malnutrition should be addressed through a combination of community-based education and care and clinic-based therapy.
- FFT can be useful for training farmers in alternative crop management techniques, including low input agriculture and integrated pest management. FFT programs have the potential to aid the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry’s goal of increasing agricultural production.
- The least developed areas should be supported directly with food and cash income opportunities, more services, infrastructure and increased local government and civil society organization/community-based organization capacity. An integrated approach that provides benefits to all groups in a community and incentives to move away from free food and other services may work better than a sectoral approach.

- Given the potential of FFE programs to increase enrollment, reduce school dropouts, improve stability and improve students' health and nutrition, these programs should be scaled up to cover more schools in the state.

## 6. SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES RELATED TO HEALTH AND NUTRITION

### 6.1 Current Health and Nutrition Conditions in Southern Sudan

As southern Sudan moves out of a prolonged crisis and emergency toward developing a viable political, social and economic infrastructure, the need for mainstreaming and highlighting nutrition is critical. The long-term consequences of inaction on the direct and underlying causes of malnutrition will have real effects on household productivity and the ability to educate future citizens of southern Sudan.

Although the last Demographic and Health Survey was conducted in 1989, a number of studies have been carried out, including a Sudan Household Health Survey in 2006. The estimates of malnutrition by all of these surveys confirm that the health and nutrition challenges are enormous. “Estimated rates for maternal (1,700/100,000) and child (250/1,000) mortality are among the highest in the world” (World Bank 2006). Approximately 45 percent of the children under five are chronically malnourished. The average GAM rate in southern Sudan, according to the SHHS, is 29 percent (GOSS 2007).

Food insecurity, for varying reasons, is still a major problem and will continue to be a problem in the foreseeable future. A number of factors clearly contribute to food and nutritional insecurity among displaced households. For instance, none of the camps systematically prepared inhabitants for a return to a rural and farming existence at their former homesteads. Moreover, a large number of camps are not equipped with basic services like health, safe water and sanitation. Finally, there is almost no accessible recuperation service to treat malnourished children in the camps.

Health care facilities are sparsely scattered. In 2004, according to figures provided by GOSS Ministry of Health, southern Sudan had one medical doctor per 100,000 inhabitants. Within Central Equatoria, a number of counties had a population to health facility ratio as high as 10,000:1 (MoH 2006), and this in a state with better than average health coverage. Mothers often delay treatment of child illness due to time demands and long distances.

Among the six states studied, the neonatal mortality rate is highest in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (84 per 1,000 live births) and lowest in Jonglei (34 per 1,000 live births), the infant mortality rate is also highest in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (111/1,000 live births) and lowest in Central Equatoria (59/1,000 live births). The under-five mortality rate is highest in Blue Nile (166) and lowest in Central Equatoria (103) (SHHS 2006).

Qualitative analyses conducted by Concern and Action Contre la Faim found malnutrition had stronger associations with morbidity and factors underlying morbidity—difficult access to and unsafe use of water, delayed/ inadequate health care and poor personal and environmental hygiene—than food availability. In Central Equatoria, key informant interviews suggest that the most common illnesses in the area were malaria, respiratory infections and diarrhea—all strongly associated with poor nutritional status.

Morbidity data collected by nutritional surveys in Northern Bahr el Ghazal indicated that of the children surveyed, 45 percent to 57 percent were sick within the two weeks prior to the survey. Considering the entirety of south Sudan, the Ministry of Health reports that “the prevalence of diarrhea in under-fives is 45 percent, [the] ...acute respiratory infection figure is 30 percent and for fever is 61 percent.” (Secretariat of Health 2004).

The analyses of high malnutrition levels also highlighted the detrimental feeding practices of young children (infrequent breastfeeding; premature introduction of water or animal milk and delayed introduction, poor quality and infrequent consumption of other complementary foods). This factor could explain the results that show that younger children, age six months to 30 months, are more affected by malnutrition than older children. The National Nutrition Survey in the South Sudan States reports that only 11 percent to 28 percent of infants aged less than six months are exclusively breastfed (MoH 2006).

Research in Sudan shows a weak association between malnutrition and food availability and socioeconomic status. Poor child feeding practices, morbidity and factors underlying morbidity—distant and unsafe water sources, delayed and inadequate health care and poor personal and environmental hygiene—show stronger associations with malnutrition and are likely to be as important, or even more important, than food availability or access (Steffen et al. 2007). Apart from general malnutrition as can be measured anthropometrically, women are generally at risk of iron deficiency anemia, physiological malfunctions due to micronutrient deficiency and reduced immunity to infection. These conditions are exacerbated in situations where there is widespread economic poverty, gender inequity and high illiteracy, especially amongst women.

Women in southern Sudan are involved in food production and income generation activities that require intense physical labor. Meanwhile, many women do not have access to adequate food to meet their energy and micronutrient needs. Domestic violence, certain cultural practices including polygamy, insecurity and loss of male members in the household have created many female-headed households where a woman, with little skills to earn a decent living, is left to take care of children and the rest of the household.

Most of these women are also chronically malnourished. Physical growth and skeletal development of these women have faltered or are at risk of faltering. The later also affects the reproductive role. Most southern Sudanese mothers are likely to enter their reproductive role undernourished. The state of women’s health has huge implications for the state of children’s health as mothers are the primary caretakers.

## **6.2 Nutrition Recommendations**

Despite repeated efforts to address malnutrition in southern Sudan, GAM among children under five generally remains above the emergency threshold and has not showed substantial change since the signing of the CPA. While many factors contribute to this dire nutrition situation, the lack of coordination between government and nongovernment actors is perhaps the most prominent (GOSS 2007).

Despite the fact that very few international organizations and partners are directly involved in nutrition programming, state and national governments currently lack the financial and human resources necessary to effectively coordinate them. As a result, individual development partners operating in southern Sudan have tended to plan and implement nutrition-related activities in an ad-hoc manner with GOSS. In response, participants of the National Planning and Coordination Meeting held in November 2006 recommended the development of a “master national plan” for nutrition. As envisioned, the master plan would promote a multisector approach to nutrition with a primary focus on coordinating state nutritional plans and assistance provided by key development partners, as well as the establishment of common indicators and standard reporting formats (GOSS/MoH 2007, FANTA 2006).

To support the coordination of nutrition-related activities with coherent policies, the MoH also proposed establishing a National Nutrition Council with a mandate to coordinate and oversee nutrition activities across sectors. Under this arrangement, the Nutrition Technical Working Group would be responsible for operationalizing the standards set by the National Nutrition Council (GOSS/MoH 2007, FANTA 2006).

In terms of specific priorities for reducing malnutrition in the region, the authors offer the following recommendations:

- ***Promote development of a National Nutrition Policy***

In addition to providing technical support to the nutrition policy planning process, donor and NGO partners are encouraged to provide assistance to a longer-term developmental process of creating, disseminating and implementing a national Essential Nutrition Action (ENA) package in conjunction with trained state nutrition focal points, extension workers and health care professionals. This will involve building capacity of NGOs and government health services to identify and train people to staff an ENA program.

The formation of an effective National Nutrition Policy would be aided by comprehensive identification and mapping of all ongoing nutrition-related projects in southern Sudan. This is an essential step in establishing a multisector approach to nutrition and ensuring that NGO activities focusing on improving food security complement those aimed at improving primary health care.

- ***Improve funding and program coordination***

To support improved nutritional outcomes in southern Sudan, USAID should consider funding Multi-Year Assistance Programs (MYAPs) to address the underlying causes of food insecurity among both resident and returnee populations, per the suggestions made for each area visited. In the short term, to avoid a gap in program funding for ongoing NGO interventions, USAID should make provisions for OFDA and/or “bridge” funding until the round of MYAP funding is made available in FY 2009.

Donors and NGO partners should also look for ways to effectively combine Title II and Development Assistance funding in complementary ways. Coordinated funding packages should be focused on high priority areas and enable the provision of basic nutrition, health, sanitation and water services at the county level.

WFP and USAID should seek opportunities to work together to improve the targeting and monitoring of education programming currently implemented in southern Sudan. Current education programs could also be improved by including greater emphasis on nutrition education and prevention of nutrition-related illness.

- ***Strengthen the capacity of the public health system***

Donors and NGO partners are well positioned to provide technical assistance to state, county and community health care departments for the development of nutrition strategies, work plans and budgets. Part of this approach would entail the establishment of a nutrition information system as well as standard nutrition monitoring and evaluation tools for use at the national, state and county levels. Training under the Sudan Health Transformation Project should be expanded to include community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) and the provision of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF). This also entails support to GOSS to develop national guidelines for CMAM. Possibilities should be explored with NGOs of providing CMAM services with Yei hospital. JSI could also expand its activities to work more closely with Yei hospital beyond curriculum development.

- ***Improve infant and child feeding practices***

Greater effort should be made to educate both men and women about the importance of appropriate child care and feeding practices. Priority focus areas should include optimal breastfeeding practices, introduction of nutrient-dense complementary foods, linkages between maternal diet, workload and child nutrition, as well as development of seasonal- and location-specific recipes made from nutrient-dense and locally available ingredients.

Evidence suggests that the prevalence of HIV is increasing in border areas and larger towns. USAID/Sudan and NGOs operating in southern Sudan should also seek opportunities for coordinating with PEPFAR on providing counseling, testing, antenatal prevention and infant feeding practices aimed at preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV.

- ***Reduce the prevalence of child disease***

Donors and NGO partners could directly contribute to a reduction in the prevalence of childhood disease in southern Sudan by investing in improved access to safe water and increasing the coverage of public health facilities and immunization services. Greater effort could also be made to increase public awareness of the importance of personal hygiene and environmental health as a means of reducing diarrhea and other common ailments. Donors and implementing partners should also take a more proactive stance in providing education and awareness campaigns aimed at preventing the spread of HIV among both returnees and resident populations, particularly in urban areas.

- ***Reduce the work demands of women***

High rates of malnutrition among children in southern Sudan are directly related to the heavy workloads of many women. Donors and implementing partners could contribute to improved child nutrition by creating opportunities for income generation among women (especially those who are heads of households) and promoting labor-saving agricultural technologies such as food processing tools and irrigation systems.

## 7. OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

The operating environment of southern Sudan offers a unique opportunity for USAID to use Title II resources in a strategic way to support the livelihood recovery of the local population. The following programming principles should be taken into account in all interventions being considered.

- **Humanitarian resources and development assistance should be coordinated around the same strategic objectives** – Instead of creating standalone Title II projects that are implemented separately from other Mission interventions, attempts should be made to link ongoing programs in health, education, capacity building and livelihood strengthening using food as a complementary resource. This will require geographic concentration of Title II, OFDA and DA resources to maximize program impact and visibility.
- **NGOs and USAID contractors have different comparative strengths that should be coupled together** – Ways should be sought to combine these strengths in any competitive bidding process where both types of organizations are required on bids (APS or RFA).
- **Different contexts in southern Sudan will require different transition approaches along the relief-development continuum** – Each area will be going through multiple transitions in terms of the security situation, livelihood strategies and markets and the nature of the state and formal institutions. The way that assistance is programmed can either hinder or help each of these transitions. In Equatoria, development activities can be started with some attention to relief activities as the transitions occur. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warab, as well as the Three Areas, development relief should be the primary focus with flexible programs in place that can shift back and forth depending on the circumstances. In Upper Nile and Jonglei, relief/emergency programming will still be the dominant modus operandi with some development activities initiated where appropriate.
- **The government's capacity for disaster response needs to be strengthened because many of the regions will continue to have recurrent emergencies for some time in the future** – Flooding is a widespread and severe problem this year in Upper Nile and Jonglei as well as NBEG and Warab. More emergency food and nonfood items will be needed in these areas in 2007-2008 to respond to the plight of flood victims and returnees. Current prepositioned supplies are inadequate. Temporarily fixing the bottlenecks in the roads will be critical in getting supplies in this year in a timely way.
- **Every intervention should look for ways to build the institutional and human capacity of the southern Sudan Government** – Food for training could be used to support some of this capacity building.
- **Interventions should have a major focus on women** – Women are the primary farmers in many areas as well and the major caregivers of children.

- **Whenever possible, ways should be sought to engage the youth in program activities** – To reduce future conflict, programs that promote skill development and income generation for the youth will be critical.

Taking these principles into account, a number of programming components are proposed.<sup>31</sup> These components would not be implemented simultaneously in all locations but would be phased in depending upon the context.

**1. Social safety nets** should be maintained and improved to manage natural and manmade disasters and to facilitate resettlement. Many of the emergency food assistance programs currently being carried out by NGOs and WFP will have to continue for the foreseeable future. Key to such programs will be food security information systems (WFP), prepositioned stocks in areas that are isolated in the rainy season and rapid response capacity. OFDA and FFP funding will be vital to move these efforts forward. Strengthening the capacity of GOSS in disaster preparedness and response will be a major activity.

**2. Road construction** – Improved transport infrastructure will be essential for effective safety nets, access to social services and access to markets. Trunk roads that connect major urban centers will need culverts for better drainage so that they do not become impassible in the rainy season every year. Farm-to-market roads would be improved through FFW. NGOs and WFP would help oversee FFW activities related to the development of feeder roads. Roads are the key to any transition strategy.

**3. Basic social services and livelihood support** – Several activities can be implemented to ensure that the peace dividends are passed on to the local population. These include:

- a. **Public and social service delivery** – Continuing OFDA and FFP's support of NGOs, UNICEF and WFP in providing public and social services in towns and villages. This includes providing health services, schools and water. Food-assisted Maternal and Child Health and school feeding will be given high priority. Every effort should be made to link up with existing health and education projects being implemented by USAID contractors with DA resources. Malnutrition should be addressed through better access to and use of water, access to health care, hygiene awareness and child care and feeding practices. NGOs should develop an effective behavior change and communication strategy to tackle the major causes of malnutrition. Opportunities will be sought to link the local purchase of food through WFP with school feeding and to use FFW to build infrastructure.
- b. **Basic infrastructure in small urban centers at the county level should be rehabilitated or developed through block grants to state and county governments** – These urban centers would act as public access points for rural populations. Through the development of such infrastructure, rural catchment areas would have minimal access to health care, schools, water, electricity and communication. Local governments would have the capacity and resources to better serve their constituents. These block grants would also be linked to NGO MYAP

<sup>31</sup> Many of these recommendations coincide with those being proposed by other USAID offices.

- programs in regions focused on building community capacity and infrastructure in rural areas.
- c. Livelihood support** – Depending upon the main livelihoods in different areas, the type of support will be tailored to what is appropriate (restocking, provision of tools, provision of seed, seed fairs, extension support, training centers for farmers, small scale irrigation systems, soil and water conservation, etc.). FFW would be used to build community infrastructure and rehabilitate farm-to-market roads. FFT would be used to support farmer training and farmer field schools. Providing access to seed locally purchased from contract farmers would help reestablish agriculturally based livelihoods. Seed fairs and seed vouchers would be used to stimulate the emergence of commercial seed networks. To promote off-farm opportunities, vocational training centers teaching skills in carpentry, masonry, sewing, auto repair and computers would receive support. In regions where such vocational training centers do not exist, they would have to be established.
- d. Health and nutrition support**<sup>32</sup> – Southern Sudan has many nutritional emergencies combined with adverse living conditions. Very few international organizations and partners are actively involved in nutrition programs, and those that are focus on acute malnutrition when the underlying situation is one of chronic malnutrition. At the community level, there is no real consciousness of the importance of nutrition. There is neither a GOSS mechanism nor the capacity in place to direct/allocate nutrition interventions. Government capacity falls far below the ability to respond adequately, and the nascent Nutrition Program faces serious funding constraints.

In the short term, it is recommended that the USAID Mission bring in a nutritionist to work with its HPN officer to develop a short, medium and long-term strategy for addressing high rates of chronic and acute malnutrition. The Mission should support the introduction of a community-based primary prevention intervention similar to the Gambia Baby Friendly Community Initiative, as a partnership between WFP and UNICEF and led by the Nutrition Office of MoH. This could be supported through a JSI partnership or through an Infant and Young Child Nutrition Cooperative Agreement (IYCN) and through the IYCN partnership with CARE (CARE has an ongoing Infant Feeding in Emergencies Initiative).

This intervention would build on the presence of traditional birth attendants and include training of community midwives and primary health care workers at Yei training center and retraining of those who have already been trained. The approach could be introduced in communities where there are trained community midwives and/or primary health care workers as a pilot, or, alternatively, where there is already an NGO presence working in agriculture, health and/or community development. It could also build on volunteers in communities where there has been an emergency intervention to rehabilitate severely malnourished children. The intervention would focus on the next child to be born along with rehabilitating current malnourished children under five. The USAID Mission (through FANTA support) should assist in

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<sup>32</sup> The LAYERS tool developed by FANTA should be used to assist the USAID Mission in monitoring Title II program implementation.

facilitating the finalization of a nutrition policy that a FANTA consultant helped initiate in FY 2007. Finally, USAID/Sudan should assist GOSS in obtaining support from WFP's maternal child health and gender programming services and from UNICEF through its Baby Friendly Health Initiative.

In the medium term, USAID/Sudan should provide continued support through FANTA to the Nutrition Unit of GOSS to:

- Bring to fruition the process of policy development, including the community-based framework
- Determine and analyze gaps in the provision of nutrition services and recommend strategies to address such gaps
- Reach terms of cooperation and coordinate mechanism between GOSS and state levels in the implementation of nutrition services
- Define the multisectoral scope of nutrition programming and recommend government institutional framework for the provision of comprehensive services to improve the overall nutrition situation
- Support Nutrition Unit in obtaining funds for necessary training and supervisory functions at national, state and local levels
- Develop a technical working group that is led by the GOSS Nutrition Unit to involve PVOs, international organizations and bilaterals working to improve nutritional status

**4. Agriculturally based, market-led growth for small holders** – It is difficult to understate the limitations and challenges placed on agricultural development in southern Sudan by the disaggregation of markets there. These limitations are a result of the very poor condition of transport arteries, including roads and river transport; lack of basic services for farmers, such as input dealers, market information and finance and lack of basic market institutions such as grading and standards systems and phytosanitary controls. The following activities are proposed to support market-led growth for small holders.

- a. **Link livelihood support activities promoted by NGOs with ongoing USAID agriculture support projects** – Existing work being carried out by Land of Lakes on dairy and livestock, AMED, CLTR, UMAD and STEP would be better linked to NGO livelihood promotion activities. Such linkages would emphasize a value chain approach.
- b. **MYAPs would be designed to strengthen farmer to market linkages** – MYAPs would link farmer groups to service providers and markets; farmer field schools and farmer to farmer exchanges would enable new technologies to be introduced; efforts would be made to strengthen input suppliers and better market information would be made available through improved communication channels (cell phones).

Unlike many of its neighbors, southern Sudan had a relatively positive experience with cooperatives, and many farmers look back on this institution in a positive light. Cooperatives could be a useful mechanism to improve terms of trade, both by reducing the cost of marketing surpluses and lowering the cost of acquiring inputs.

Cooperatives could have the added advantage of reaching a large number of relatively sparse populations of producers quickly.

- c. Rural finance would be made available to provide a source of credit** – The provision of better access to credit will support livelihoods through increased investment and market expansion, open opportunities in trade and create employment. Support to microcredit programs is needed to enable households to expand their productive capacity. This will reduce risks associated with storing wealth in livestock, which are subject to loss.
- d. GOSS Ministry of Agriculture would be linked with CGIARS to source agricultural technologies** – These would include CYMMT, IITA, ICRISAT, ICRAF and CIP. GOSS currently is receiving a number of improved crop varieties from the center for replication.
- e. Agricultural training centers would be better supported** – This includes the Crop Training Center, the Agricultural Training Center being implemented by NPA, the Forestry Training Center, the Fisheries Training Center, the Livestock Training Center and the Wildlife Training Center. Bridging funds would be needed in the short term until these centers can put in place a cost recovery/sustainability strategy.

**5. Market integration** – In terms of the lack of market institutions, although Sudan is frequently viewed as being “outside” of events in the larger region of eastern Africa, it does in fact share much in common with its neighbors, which will eventually need to become its trading partners as well. Sudan is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and as such is committed to the African Union (AU) Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). Indeed, COMESA endorsed CAADP at a meeting of the ministers of agriculture of COMESA member states that was held in Khartoum in 2007.

In southern Sudan, and especially the Green Belt, the programs should be integrated into regional initiatives to develop market institutions. The flagship USAID program to support markets in east and southern Africa is the Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Support (RATES) program, implemented by Chemonics and supported by the Regional Economic Growth and Integration (REGI) office of the USAID East Africa Mission. This program promotes regional trade in four strategic value chains (cotton and textiles, livestock and dairy, coffee and grains). In addition to working with COMESA to improve the enabling policy environment for trade in these commodities, RATES also sets up advocacy organizations to represent stakeholders in the policy arena. In the grains sector, RATES launched the East Africa Grains Council (EAGC) at the Second Annual Grain Trade Summit in Nairobi in April 2007, to promote structured grain trade in COMESA. EAGC is also specifically responsible for harmonizing grading and standards systems, and for establishing a contract arbitration mechanism in the East Africa community.

## **8. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO MULTIYEAR TITLE II PROGRAMMING**

### **8.1 Program Proposal for Central and Eastern Equatoria**

A substantial number of households in the areas visited are vulnerable to chronic food insecurity due to agricultural production and productivity constraints and poorly integrated markets. The nature and circumstances of that food insecurity indicate an opportunity for successful development relief programming. Initially, the project area should comprise the western half of Eastern Equatoria and the eastern half of Central Equatoria (roughly extending from Yei in CES to Torit in EES, corresponding to the greenbelt agro-ecological zone), and might target roughly 25,000 households. The objectives of the MYAP would be to revitalize the agricultural livelihoods of returning refugees and people whose activities were disrupted by LRA violence. The strategies would be threefold:

- a) Livelihood provisioning (including food assistance) as returnees continue to arrive and take up residence
- b) Livelihood recovery, providing seeds, tools, water/sanitation facilities as well as technical assistance as households resume farming activities
- c) Livelihood promotion linking farmers with input and output markets

FFP food imports are justified as local and household food availability is constrained for much of the year, and local markets are not efficiently linked to areas of high productivity. Local purchase of commodities may one day be feasible but should not be applied now due to risks of market distortions. Food distributed in conjunction with strategies b and c above can use a food-for-assets mechanism for activities such as road rehabilitation and other locally prioritized infrastructure development activities. The program should plan a three- to five-year duration, with most households able to graduate in three years. The program should be contracted out to an international NGO via a competitive bidding process. The two NGOs active in the area, NPA and CRS, would be eligible bidders but either would require a new staff with developmental skill sets to be competitive. Local government should be incorporated into planning, implementation and evaluation, both to build capacity and to ensure sustainability.

### **8.2 Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warab**

A majority of households in the areas visited appear to be vulnerable to food insecurity. Recently returned households are vulnerable because they have not reestablished their production base, and longer-term residents are vulnerable due to the extensive floods of 2007. A MYAP in these areas, combining development and relief resources, would be appropriate for a minimum of five years to aid recovery during the transition, followed by a cycle of more developmentally oriented MYAPs.

Although this study was not an evaluation activity, two NGOs working in food security, AMURT and World Vision, would benefit from Title II support to continue and expand their activities. The operational context is logistically difficult and costly, and there is a need to attract more NGOs to the area to deliver field-level services.

Programming approaches will vary according to the status of the households and communities targeted. Where the majority of people are returning or recently returned, food assistance should be continued, along with basic agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools. Title II support to therapeutic feeding activities should be used where there are high rates of acute malnutrition. In more settled areas where livelihood recovery is under way, Title II support can be invested in FFW to increase agricultural production. FFE can support community-run and vocational schools with school feeding; additionally primary schools can benefit from girls' incentive programs, school gardens and latrine construction. Rehabilitation of feeder roads using FFW should be a priority for helping communities to become more connected to major towns and to open up potential markets. Supplemental feeding for pregnant and lactating women and children under five years of age should be supported through health clinics, to complement a comprehensive package of interventions that include immunization, micronutrient supplementation, education on breastfeeding and complementary feeding practices for mothers. FFR in urban areas can help rebuild market infrastructure while supporting skilled urban returnees' immediate food needs until recovery efforts can generate employment opportunities.

### **8.3 Jonglei and Upper Nile States**

Given the flooding and insecurity in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, it is recommended that OFDA/FFP continue emergency programming at least for the foreseeable future. Currently, conditions are not stable enough for a multiyear programming effort such as a MYAP.

### **8.4 Program Interventions for the Three Areas**

#### **8.4.1 Abyei**

In the Abyei area, Title II funding can be used to reinforce the CPA by focusing on the two largest and most food insecure groups, returnees and migrants. A MYAP mechanism would be appropriate to help meet the immediate food security needs of vulnerable populations, as well as support the provision of agricultural training and inputs to facilitate the recovery process. Since the area is fertile, an initial five-year MYAP should be considered.

There are few NGOs in the area, especially in the highly vulnerable, politically sensitive and insecure area north of Abyei town. NGOs present include Mercy Corps, GOAL and Save the Children/UK. More NGOs experienced in food assistance and food security programming are needed in the area to implement future programs.

Programming approaches will vary according to the status of the households and communities targeted. For new returnees, food assistance and basic agricultural inputs should continue to be provided in line with assessment recommendations, particularly highly vulnerable, war-affected groups such as female-headed households. For newly settled returnees, FFW for agricultural production improvements and community asset creation will provide a mechanism to assist these and other vulnerable households. Since Abyei is an important trade link, FFR and FFW should be used to construct feeder roads and revitalize village market infrastructure. It is critically important to pay attention to the needs of the urban returnees, who possess skills that will aid recovery. Food assistance should be used in conjunction with technical and vocational training

services for returnees in urban areas to support stability and the growth of essential nonfarm services. Food assistance could also support forums to promote peace building among communities that may come into conflict, a high risk among agricultural and nomadic communities in the area.

The teams were unable to visit Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and so cannot make recommendations regarding the establishment of MYAPs.

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## ANNEX A: PERSONS CONSULTED

Name	Organization	Position
Lual Kuol Lual	ACAT	Field Coordinator
Brian Donaldson	ACF	Country Representative, Juba
Donald Kreamer	ACF	Watsan Program Manager, Alek
Elizabeth Leu	AED	Chief of Party, South Sudan Technical Assistance Program
Nick Mayison	AMURT	
Adam Bernstein	CHF International	Khartoum
Marion McGowan	CHF International	Juba
Peter	CORDAID	
Susan Kilobia	CONCERN	Food Security Program Manager
Mark Snyder	CRS	Country Director
Jim Ashman	CRS	
Leonard Lagu	CRS	Agriculture Manager, Nimule
Gabriel Unzi	CRS	Food Monitor, Nimule
Martin Muya	CRS	End-Use Checker, Nimule
Grace Aba	CRS	Nutritionist, Nimule
Sebit John	CRS	Agriculture Extension Agent, Nimule
Martin Okot	CRS	Nutrition Worker, Nimule
Daniel Ariop	CRS	Nutrition Worker, Nimule
John Angang	CRS	Nutrition Worker, Nimule
Damaris Ruheri	CRS	Health/Nutrition Manager, Torit/Ikotos
James Gbagbe Duku	CRS	Project Manager Agriculture, Torit/Ikotos
Mario Otwar Sebjeo	CRS	Food Monitor, FFW Officer, Torit/Ikotos
Alvaro Ortega	ECHO	
Paul Symonds	ECHO	EC Food Security Advisor
Thomas Tilson	EDC	Chief of Party, South Sudan Technical Assistance Program
George Okech	FAO	Sector Lead for Food Security & Livelihoods, WFP Co-Chair with NGO Partners
Evans Kenyi	FAO	Aweil Team Leader
Simon Baka	FAO	Torit
Issaac Kenyi		Program Assistant – FFE/SFP Focal Point
Magen Deng		Program Assistant FFW/FFT Focal Point
Fernandez Sejero	GOAL	Acting Area Manager
Ayam Mawier	GOAL	Nutritionist
Michael Roberto Kenyi	GOSS/MoA&F	Director of Planning
Victoria Eluzai	GOSS/MoH	Director of Nutrition
Deng Machar	GOSS	Secretary, Gogrial West County
Anei Kuil Athian	GOSS	Acting Returnees Coordinator
James Madut Reec	GOSS	Boma Administrator
Awet Aker	GOSS	County Commissioner's Office Twic County
Charles Moyer Kuol	GOSS	Executive Director, County Commissioner's Office Twic County
Philip Thon Leck	GOSS	Governor, Jonglei
Mary Giudice	IOM	Coordinator for South Sudan
Michael Duku	Mercy Corps	Project Manager, Aweil East County
Christopher Rooks	Mercy Corps	Program Manager
Kuol Deng	NDO	Administrator
Frederic Wekesa Lukhanyo	NPA	
George Githuka	NPA	
Ken Miller	NPA	
Patrick Butler	NPA	Development Programs

Maker Buong	NPA	Veterinary Project
John Brown	NPA	Agronomist
Sam Mabior	NPA	Emergency Food Security
John Aping	NPA	Emergency Food Security
Ezana Getahun Garang	NPA	Agriculture Coordinator
Chol Chimam Garang	NPA	Field Coordinator for Jonglei
Samual Ador Thon	NPA	Field Monitor, Duk County
Samuel Deng Maguet	NPA	Food Security Agronomist
Mathew Deng Garang	NPA	Assistant Relief Monitor for Duk County
Peter Kuol Riail	NPA	Assistant Agronomist for Duk County
Justin Obella	NPA	Field Monitor, Kajo Keji
Davis Gulaale	NPA	Field Coordinator, Kajo Keji
Fredirick Wekesa Luichanyo	NPA	Food Security Assessment Manager, Kajo Keji
Sumbua Naima	NPA	Assistant Field Coordinator and Finance Officer, Kajo Keji
Michael Wani	NPA	Senior Agriculturist, Kajo Keji
Livia Nourua	NPA	Field Monitor, Kajo Keji
Mario Samaja	OCHA	Return and Integration Officer
John Kimbrough	OFDA	
Jennifer Anthony	OFDA	
Ajang Mabior Ajang		D /CED
Joseph Ding Dan		Twic County Officer
Deng Tiop		Executive Director, Twic East County
Ding Akol Ding		Commissioner, Twic East County
Chol Deng Gutnyin		Commissioner for Agriculture
Deng Sam Majok	SRRC	Secretary of Duk County
Mayer Mauyok Aruk		Administrator of Duk County
Dau Deng Malual		Director of Education, Duk County
Jacos Manyany Malual		Department of Health, Duk County
Majok Chol Jok		Chief of the Payam
Mailuly Mach Bol		Head of Joint Court, Duk County
Abraham Madiale		Department of Veterinary Services
John Yak Mayom		Department of Security
Pual Monykwer Dut		Executive Director of Duk County
James Mach Rui		Payam Administrator & Pagak
Bil Ciach Rut		Deputy Payam Pagak
Hussen Mar Nyuot		***
Michael Majok Ayom		Political Affairs
Edward Salah Darios		Deputy Principal of Yei Agricultural Training Center
David Bala		Director Principal CTC
Patric Anauo	Save the Children/UK	
Buony Chul Kior	SRRC	Pagak
Thuok Dojiok	SRRC	Store & Equipment
James Kueth	SRRC	Emergency Coordinator
Peter Dhan	SRRC	Administrator, NBEG
Bol Dau	SRRC/HAC	
Gabriel Juach	SRRC	Secretary of East Twic County
Chol Gabriel	SRRC	Inspector of Agriculture
Mamadou Sawaneh	UNDP	
Jason Matus	UNDP	
Patric Anauo	Save the Children/UK	
Romanus Mkerenga	UNICEF	Chief of Nutrition and Health
Lucy Mukuria	UNICEF	Acting OIC for Nutrition
Gary Alex	USAID	EGAT
Matt Anderson	USAID	FFP
Inez Andrews	USAID	Education Officer

Sue Anthony	USAID	FFP
Doug Balko	USAID	AFR/SP
David Rinck	USAID	FFP Regional Officer, East Africa
Pamela Fessenden	USAID	FFP
Jamie Fisher	USAID	FFP
Mark Meassick	USAID	PDO
Tong Deng	USAID/USDA	USAID/FFP Food Monitor
Katherine Almquist	USAID	Assistant Administrator
Jonathan Dworkin	USAID	Acting Director FFP
Abdel Rahman Hamid	USAID	FFP Khartoum Food Security Monitor
Salma Rashid	USAID	FFP Khartoum Food Monitor
Allen Reed	USAID	DCD
John Marks	USAID/OFDA	
Jennifer Mayer	USAID	DCHA/OFDA
Kifle Negash	USAID	Economic Infrastructure Division, Supervisory General Development Officer
Phil Steffan	USAID	EGAT
Kuol Nyok	WARDS	Executive Director
Peter Guest	WFP	CETA Coordinator WFP Sudan
Julio Vasconcelos	WFP	CETA Programming Officer
Alessandra Gilotta	WFP	CETA Programming Officer
Bill Nall	WFP	WFP Strategy & Planning
Paul Buffard	WFP	WFP Head of Programming
Kenro Oshidari	WFP	Representative
Mariam Yun	WFP	WFP Reports/Donor Relations Unit
Daniel Molla	WFP	VAM Unit Head
Laura Turner	WFP	
Pascal Joannes	WFP	Head of Procurement
Justin Bigirishya	WFP	South Sudan Coordinator
Billy Mwinga	WFP	VAM Officer
Ami Nagamune	WFP	
Machor Malok	WFP	Aweil Program Assistant
Clement Aturjang	WFP	Aweil Program Assistant
Ndeley Agbaw	WFP	Akon Head of Sub Office
Celina Poni	WFP	Program Officer
Ian McDonald	WFP	Head of South Sudan Program
Theoney Kagaruki	WFP	Education Sector Specialist, Juba
Ellen Kramer	WFP	Nutritionist, Juba
Seth Le Leu	WVI	Program Director
Tamba Macauley	WVI	Commodities Officer
Paul Brima	WVI	Commodities Officer
Daniel Nyabera	WVI	Project Team Leader, Gogrial County
Lois Miahoo	WVI	Nutrition Officer
Caroline Ndungu	WVI	Commodity Officer

## **ANNEX B: TERMS OF REFERENCE**

### **Scope of Work: USAID/FFP Sudan Food Assistance Transition Study**

#### **Background**

USAID/FFP has supported emergency food assistance programming throughout southern Sudan's long years of conflict-induced displacement and malnutrition. As a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, USAID/Sudan has developed a new Strategy Statement to respond to the significant challenges and opportunities in supporting the southern Sudanese transition from war to peace. The Strategy Statement focuses on vulnerable areas, and shifts from a sectoral focus to a cross-cutting multisectoral approach that supports the implementation of the CPA. Implementation of the CPA is slow. Institutions and capacities are nascent throughout southern Sudan, and the political and administrative infrastructures of the new government remain weak. Joint integrated units of the SPLM and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have yet to be properly established, and SAF withdrawal from garrison towns is proceeding slowly.

Relative peace and security have set the stage for southern Sudan's internally displaced populations (IDP) to return to their homes. Sudan's 22-year civil war left the world's greatest concentration of IDPs—more than 4 million people within Sudan—and caused more than 600,000 refugees to flee to neighboring countries. The main population movements are returning refugees and IDPs, the latter who have been living in the Greater Khartoum area. There is also a substantial number, though relatively unaccounted for, of returnees within southern Sudan. The reintegration and recovery of livelihoods for displaced and other conflict-affected people is essential. To ensure stability, receiving communities, particularly in rural areas, will need assistance in developing or expanding service provision, including water systems, health clinics and education; as well as enhanced opportunities for economic growth and livelihood recovery, including market recovery and/or development; vocational training; microenterprise development; agriculture and livestock inputs and technology transfer.

Despite more than two years of general stability under the CPA, large numbers of people remain precariously vulnerable to food insecurity. The UN World Food Program estimates that 26 percent of Sudanese are malnourished, and food security will likely remain fragile in the near term, due to increased demand from returnees, lack of access to and availability of agricultural market structures and essential public and social services, unstable commodity prices, pockets of localized conflict and displacement and vulnerable populations' lack of access to food.

That said, it is clearly not desirable for Sudan to continue to rely so heavily on international food aid and other relief assistance. The CPA has set the stage for a move toward more self-reliance. Abundant natural resources provide a basis for sustainable livelihoods and food security, though the decades of civil war leave a legacy of daunting challenges to establish a "normal" economy.

## Proposed Action

FANTA, DCHA/FFP and USAID/Sudan will undertake a Food Assistance Transition Study to assist the Mission to: a) sharpen the focus of current food assistance programming toward attaining sustainable food security and b) identify potential linkages with longer-term development programs (USAID, GOSS, GNU and other donors) to improve food security in southern Sudan and the Three Areas.

## Proposed Review Outcomes/Objectives

The Food Assistance Transition Study will:

1. Assess the impact of stability on those areas and groups considered to be the most food insecure and nutritionally vulnerable in southern Sudan and the Three Areas.
2. Make recommendations about how Title II resources should be used as an appropriate component in addressing the prevailing food security issues.

The objectives of this review include:

- Determining the underlying factors leading to high rates of chronic and acute malnutrition
- Identifying key factors that support and constrain food availability and food access
- Determining appropriate food and nonfood interventions to address the food insecurity
- Developing with FFP and USAID/Sudan next steps or options to address food insecurity in southern Sudan and the Three Areas using Title II and/or DA funding

Among the questions and issues to be addressed are:

- How has the relative peace offered by the CPA affected these vulnerable populations?
- Do current programs address priority geographic areas and target groups?
- How can current Title II programs be adjusted to provide more sustainable support to food security and livelihoods?
- What government strategies and programs related to food security are currently in place and what are the constraints?
- What are the key constraints in implementing food security and food assistance programs?
- In what ways is civil society functioning or not functioning to support food assistance programs?
- How can food assistance programs be improved to better complement the efforts of GOSS, GNU (in the Three Areas) and USAID development programs in health, agriculture, infrastructure and education?

The review will assess current food assistance programs and opportunities or needs for adjustments in the programs in the future. In looking at the use and effectiveness of current food assistance programs, the team will assess:

- Efficiency and effectiveness of current programs and implementers in delivering food assistance
- Geographic targeting and coverage

- Plans for meeting food needs of IDP returnees, refugees and demobilized combatants as they reintegrate into communities
- Role of food assistance and implications for reducing potential for local level conflicts
- Options for graduation or exit strategies for food programs

In looking at the use of food assistance to promote more robust food security, the teams will assess options for:

- Using a diversity of food assistance delivery and distribution mechanisms (food for work, food for education, etc.) directly tailored to the needs and opportunities of distinct situations
- Linking food assistance to broader livelihood development strategies
- Exploring opportunities to work with WFP as well as NGO MYAPs in support of livelihood development strategies
- Developing markets to meet food needs, through use of food assistance and nonfood assistance resources to revive local economies
- Adjusting current and proposed USAID food assistance activities to promote enhanced food security

## Methodology

Three FANTA/TANGO-led teams will consult with a wide range of interested parties, including USAID/Washington's Africa Bureau and the Food for Peace Office, USAID/Sudan, appropriate UN agencies, including WFP, FAO, UNICEF; Government of Southern Sudan at Juba and state/county levels; Government of National Unity in the Three Areas, and PVOs/NGOs dealing with food assistance and food security issues. FFP and USAID/Sudan will provide documentation on current FFP food assistance programs and Mission activities, as well as basic background information as available. In Khartoum and Juba, the teams will consult with organizations working in southern Sudan to build a picture of ongoing activities and key food security issues. The teams will then gather additional nutritional, food security and food assistance information from the UN, PVOs, donors and local authorities and populations in the field.

The review will focus on southern Sudan in the context of the transition from civil war to stable development under the CPA. The states to be surveyed are:<sup>33</sup>

In southern Sudan:

- Northern Bahr El Ghazal (suggested counties: Aweil, Gogrial, Twic)
- Jonglei (suggested counties: Bor, Twic East, Duk, Akobo)
- Central Equatoria

In the Three Areas:

- Southern Kordofan (Abyei)
- Southern Kordofan (Kauda, Dilling, Talodi)
- Blue Nile (Kurmuk, other counties in southern Blue Nile)

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<sup>33</sup> The total number of counties listed will be surveyed if logistics and time permit.

In advance of field work, the teams will review available documentation and current programs of USAID, GOSS and other donors. Emphasis will be on immediate actions that can be taken to enhance program impact on food security and actions needed to help GOSS establish the basis for longer-term food security activities financed with its own and donor resources.

The FANTA/TANGO team leader will consult with the Mission and work with identified organizations on the ground to identify site visits. FFP/W and USAID/Sudan/FFP will be the primary point of contact for the teams and will determine sites selected, a schedule and agenda and be responsible for in-country logistics. FFP/W and USAID/Sudan staff will collaborate with the team to organize all necessary travel, visa, interview and logistical arrangements.

## **Review Teams**

Three teams will be used in this assessment. For each team, one member will be from FANTA/TANGO, one from USAID and at least one from the government. Each team will visit two of the designated states and at least two counties in each state.

## **Deliverables**

FANTA will incorporate analyses of the food security situation and the above issues into the following deliverables to be provided to FFP/Washington and USAID/Sudan. The team will provide a draft report by November 15, 2007, and a final report by November 30, 2007. This report will include:

- An overall analysis of the current situation
- Identification of key issues related to food availability, food access and use
- Identification of the direct and underlying causes of the high rates of malnutrition
- An analysis of current Title II activities and recommendations to improve them to increase the impact on food security
- Recommendations for additional uses of Title II food assistance to complement ongoing and planned development projects
- Next steps in addressing the food security and nutrition crises with the USAID/Sudan Mission
- Next steps for moving toward developing a food security strategy for the Mission

## **Timeframe**

The review will be approximately 48<sup>34</sup> days in total:

- Four days for each team member in Arizona for planning and preparation, review of existing materials on food security
- One day for travel to Washington to interview USAID staff
- Two work days in Khartoum, Sudan. This will include review and analysis of available documents and meetings with WFP, donors, FAO and PVOs/NGOs operational in the Three Areas and southern Sudan
- Seventeen days for travel to the field, in-country assessment and Mission debriefing. Extensive field visits by the three teams in southern Sudan and the Three Areas are

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<sup>34</sup> Four travel days will be required for round trip travel from Tucson, AZ, to Washington, DC, and Khartoum.

- envisioned to review current programs, constraints and opportunities. This is expected to take place during the first three weeks of October 2007.
- Ten work days for each team member for write-up of the draft, to address initial comments on the draft report by FANTA and to address comments on the second draft by USAID.
  - Ten work days for each team member to address additional comments, produce the third draft and finalize the report.

### **Qualifications of TANGO International, Inc.**

TANGO International has extensive experience in project design, monitoring and evaluation, risk and vulnerability assessments, quantitative surveys and qualitative assessments, designing development relief projects and food programs for countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

TANGO has particular expertise in the food security sector, involved since its founding with the evaluation of Title II food aid programs. In order for food assistance programming to provide the greatest impact, it must effectively target the neediest groups with appropriate rations and food-related interventions. TANGO works on all aspects of food aid programming—including strategic planning, food security assessments, program design, targeting criteria and selection processes, exit strategies, M&E systems and indicators and the development of policies and guidelines.

#### *TANGO's Capacity and Performance*

A good measure of quality and client satisfaction with TANGO's work is its high rate of repeat business. TANGO has performed numerous contracts with World Vision, Save the Children, CARE, Catholic Relief Services and other NGOs worldwide, providing assistance in all phases of food aid, development and emergency programming. Likewise, TANGO services have been requested regularly by USAID/FFP, the World Food Program and DFID. TANGO averages about 80 specialized technical assistance contracts with 15-20 international development organizations each year.

TANGO has conducted assessments, surveys and evaluations for a wide range of relief and development projects and programs. Following is a sample of relevant contracts concluded by TANGO.

- FANTA Guide for Measuring Food Access (2003)
- WFP Emergency Food Security Assessment Handbook (2004)
- FANTA/WFP Food Assistance Programming in the Context of HIV (2007)
- WFP Bangladesh Socioeconomic Profiles of WFP Operational Areas and Beneficiaries (2006)
- WFP Guideline for Partnership with NGOs (2002)
- IFAD Results & Impact Management System (2007)
- C-SAFE Final Evaluation Surveys for Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, funded by USAID (2006)
- CARE Nepal Developing New M&E Strategies in Equity and Governance (2007)
- ADRA Monitoring & Evaluation Manual (2007)
- ADRA/ ACDI-VOCA Food Security Needs Assessment Toolkit (2006)

- OICI Risk & Vulnerability Assessment Guideline (2006)
- UNRWA Data Analysis and Reporting of the Household Economic Study in the West Bank (ongoing)
- WFP Egypt Quantitative/Qualitative Food Subsidy Surveys (2005)
- Review of WFP Egypt School Feeding Programme (2006)
- World Vision Post-Tsunami Livelihood Impact Household Surveys for Thailand, India, and Sri Lanka (2005 & 2006)
- CARE, WFP, & ERREC, Eritrea Rural Livelihood Security Qualitative Assessment (2004)
- WFP Training in Monitoring and Evaluation for Emergencies (2002)
- WFP Vulnerability and Food Security Assessment in Comoros and Belize (2006)
- WFP Food Relief Project Evaluation in Bangladesh (2001)

Annually, TANGO is requested to undertake several livelihood and food security assessments and has averaged four to five Title II proposals and four to five Title II evaluations. Since 2001, TANGO has carried out 23 Title II program evaluations in more than 20 countries (see attached summary).

*TANGO Staff*

The staff being proposed for this work include Tim Frankenberger, Jeanne Downen and John Meyer. All three have extensive experience in Title II programming design and evaluation. All three have worked with WFP and NGOs engaged in food programs.